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I. INTRODUCTION

5

Beginning in the last decade of the 20th century, partially in response to widespread

6

dissatisfaction with and in the legal system and lawyers, a new movement in law has emerged – a

7

movement towards law as a healing profession. This movement takes an explicitly

8

comprehensive, integrated, humanistic, interdisciplinary, restorative, and often therapeutic

9

approach to law and lawyering. It is the result of a synthesis of a number of new disciplines

10

within law and legal practice that have been rapidly gaining visibility, acceptance, and popularity

11

in the last decade and a half, representing a number of emerging, new, or alternative forms of law

12

practice, dispute resolution, and criminal justice. The converging main “vectors” of this

13

movement are collaborative law,2 creative problem solving,3 holistic justice,4 preventive law,5
* M.S., J.D., LL.M. Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. Fellow, International Centre for Healing and
the Law. Some of the ideas expressed herein have been published in shorter form in the following publications,
which are hereby acknowledged: Susan Daicoff, The Comprehensive Law Movement, 19 TOURO L. REV. 825
(2004) (speech); SUSAN DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF (2004) (book chapter); Susan Daicoff, Resolution Without
Litigation: Are Courtrooms Battlegrounds for Losers? GPSolo (Oct.-Nov. 2003) (available at
http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/octnov2003/resolutionwithoutlit.html); and Susan Daicoff, Afterword,
in D. STOLLE, D. WEXLER, & B. WINICK, PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (2000).
2
See e.g., PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT
LITIGATION (2001) (introducing the concepts and methods of collaborative law as founded by Minnesota divorce
attorney Stuart Webb and advanced by California divorce attorney Pauline Tesler). Some of the ideas expressed in
this Article, namely, the “vectors” of the “comprehensive law movement,” were previously published by the author
in shorter forms in various book chapters and magazine articles: SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER KNOW THYSELF:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (2004) [hereinafter DAICOFF, KNOW
THYSELF] (final chapter devoted to the movement); Susan Daicoff, Afterword: The Role of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in DENNIS P. STOLLE, DAVID B. WEXLER, & BRUCE J.
WINICK, EDS., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (Carolina Academic Press 2000) [hereinafter Daicoff,
AFTERWORD], (describing the comprehensive law movement and its relationship to therapeutic jurisprudence
generally); Susan Daicoff, Resolution Without Litigation: Are Courtrooms Battlegrounds for Losers?, GPSOLO,
Oct./Nov. 2003, at 44 (summarizing the vectors of the comprehensive law movement); and in SUSAN DAICOFF, THE
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problem solving courts,6 procedural justice,7 restorative justice,8 therapeutic jurisprudence,9 and

2

transformative mediation.10

3

As early as 1997, several of these emerging disciplines had begun to merge, integrate,

4

coalesce, or link, based on similarities in their overall purposes and goals. One of the first

5

scholars to identify this was University of California – Santa Barbara sociology professor

6

Thomas Scheff, who observed in 1997 that: “[i] n recent years, an alternative approach to law, a

7

worldwide movement, has been building momentum. This movement has two vectors,
COMPREHENSIVE LAW MOVEMENT, unpublished book chapter manuscript (2003) to be included in book
forthcoming from the International Centre for Healing and the Law (also summarizing the movement).
3
See, e.g., James M. Cooper, Toward a New Architecture: Creative Problem Solving and the Evolution of Law,
34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 297 (1998) (advocating creative problem solving skills in the practice of law, legal education
and other professional fields); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998)(introducing the
emergence of creative problem solving as a legal discipline in response to the need for change in legal education);
and Thomas D. Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver, 34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 267 (1998)
(discussing a symposium issue to educate creative problem solvers). One issue of the California Western Law
Review (volume 34, issue 2) in 1998 was devoted to creative problem solving: California Western Law School
houses the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving, which sponsors a number of national and international
programs implementing CPS, as well as several law school courses on CPS.
4
See, e.g., the International Alliance of Holistic Lawyers’ website: www.iahl.org (visited April 11, 2005). Holistic
justice is primarily a grass-roots movement among practicing attorneys in the United States and abroad. The IAHL
sponsors an annual conference supporting and encouraging the holistic practice of law.
5
See, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAW: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS
(1997) (the “textbook” for preventive law; now in its second edition). Preventive law is also known as “proactive
law,” principally so in Finland, under the guidance and leadership of corporate attorney Helena Haapio.
6
E.g., drug treatment courts, mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and other specialized courts. These
courts were formalized in 2000 by the adoption of a joint resolution of the Conferences of Chief Justices and Chief
Court Administrators explicitly supporting the development of problem solving courts.
7
This is a social science concept based on social scientist Tom Tyler’s research on the factors creating satisfaction
in litigants involved in legal processes. This work has informed, and altered in some cases, thoughts on how legal
and judicial processes should proceed. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, in DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1996) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, KEY].
8
Restorative justice is one of the largest “vectors” and is associated with restorative criminal justice programs across
the United States and in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Numerous articles and books
have been written on RJ; its principal resource in the U.S. can be found through the Center for Restorative Justice at
the University of Minnesota, directed by RJ leader and Professor Mark Umbreit (website:
http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/People/Umbreit.htm) (visited April 12, 2005).
9
Therapeutic jurisprudence is also one of the largest “vectors,” if not the largest. It is represented by numerous
books and hundreds of law review articles that apply TJ to all areas of the law. Its founders, law professors David
Wexler and Bruce Winick, maintain an extensive set of resources at its website, www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org
(visited April 11, 2005).
10
Transformative mediation is associated with law professor R. Baruch Bush and is explicated in his book coauthored with communications professor Joseph Folger, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (Jossey-Bass, 1994). The
vectors are listed in alphabetical order, not in order of importance, size, or seniority.
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restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence ...”11 The term “vectors” reflects the forward

2

movement of the disciplines into the future and their convergence toward common goals. In

3

1988, I began building on Professor Scheff’s insight by examining other potential “vectors” and

4

exploring what their unifying characteristics might be. There appeared to be at least seven more

5

and, by 2000, the similarities of the nine or so vectors were so clear that I began using the

6

“comprehensive law movement” as a working title for the movement.12

7

The similarities coalesce into two common features, thus unifying the vectors as a

8

“movement.” First, each explicitly recognizes and values law’s potential as an agent of positive

9

interpersonal and individual change and seeks to bring about a positive result (such as healing,

10

wholeness, harmony, or optimal human functioning) as part of the resolution of legal matters.

11

Second, each integrates and values extralegal concerns -- factors beyond strict legal rights and
11

Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger In Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67(1) REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 97, 97 (1998).
12
Admittedly, the title is a rudimentary and nondescript one. However, the term “comprehensive law movement”
appears at least 20 times in recent literature, as follows: Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching
Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005); Marjorie A. Silver, Commitment
and Responsibility: Modeling and Teaching Professionalism Pervasively, 14 WIDENER L. J. 329 (2005); Ilhyung
Lee, In Re Culture: The Cross-Cultural Negotiations Course in the Law School Curriculum, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 375 (2005); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353 (2004); Pauline H.
Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317 (2004); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J.
Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and
Law, 14 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute
Resolution, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79 (2004); Marjorie A. Silver, Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning
in the Practice of Law, 19 TOURO L. REV. 773 (2004); James Coben & Penelope Harley, Intentional Conversations
About Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235 (2003-04);
James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1541 (2003); Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress
and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567 (2003); Leonard L. Riskin,
The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers,
and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002): Douglas A. Codiga, Reflections on the Potential Growth of
Mindfulness Meditation in the Law, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002); David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume
Through Legal Doctrine: A Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship, 3 FLA. COASTAL L. J. 123
(2002); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Legal Education: Where Do We Go From Here? 71
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 177 (2002); Steven Keeva, Once More, With Healing: Ex-Law Dean Heads Center Dedicated to
Alternative Approaches to Practice, 90 A.B.A.J. 74 (2004); Ellen Ostrow, The Lawyer's Life: Clear The Obstacles
to a Balanced Life, 39 TRIAL 27 (2003); J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo , Law As a Healing Profession, 63 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 9 (2003); Jean Hellwege, 'Comprehensive Law' Makes the Case for a Kinder, Gentler Law Practice, 39
TRIAL 12 (2003); Carole L. Mostow, Holistic Lawyers Hope to Transform Conflict Resolution, 12 NO. 4 PROF.
LAW. 24 (2000).

3
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duties-- into law and legal practice. These “rights plus”13 factors include: needs, resources,

2

goals, morals, values, beliefs, psychological matters, personal wellbeing, human development

3

and growth, interpersonal relations, and community wellbeing.

4

In recent years, a number of efforts have been made to link and disseminate the

5

important developments represented by the “vectors.”14 This article will synthesize those efforts,

6

explore the underpinnings of this movement, and then explore the ramifications of this exciting

7

movement for the future of legal education and the legal profession.

8
9

Law as a healing profession has great transformational potential. It could begin to
address the “tripartite crisis” in the legal profession of deprofessionalism, low public opinion of

10

lawyers, and lawyer distress.15 It could make the legal system a more inspiring, humane, and

11

hospitable place for clients, lawyers, judges, and indeed society as a whole.

12

II. AREAS OF CONVERGENCE -- COMMON GROUND

13

While intuitively the vectors of the comprehensive law movement may appear similar, it

14

is important to examine the precise ways in which they resemble each other, as well as the ways

15

in which they differ. Professor Bruce Winick, one of the two fathers of therapeutic

16

jurisprudence,16 described the vectors beautifully when he said they are like members of an

17

extended family. He explained that some have red hair, some have brown hair and brown eyes,

18

some have blue eyes, but when you put them all together for a group photo, a striking family

19

resemblance is evident in each member. Yet, each member has his or her own distinctive

20

features that are peculiar to that member only.17 The beauty of the movement is evident not only
13

Term attributed to Pauline H. Tesler, collaborative law co-founder and San Francisco attorney.
Daicoff, AFTERWORD, supra note 1; see also J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo, Law As A Healing Profession:
New Trends Are Expanding Choices In Law Practice, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (2003).
15
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) (describing and documenting this “tripartite crisis”).
16
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
17
Personal communication with Bruce J. Winick, Redondo Beach, CA, March, 1997.
14

4
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in the features that unify the vectors, but also in their distinct and individual differences; they

2

remain separate and vibrant movements of their own, while sharing common ground.

3

All of the disciplines comprising the comprehensive law movement share at least two

4

features in common: (1) a desire to maximize the emotional, psychological, and relational

5

wellbeing of the individuals and communities involved in each legal matter, and (2) a focus on

6

more than just strict legal rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and entitlements. These

7

two features unify the vectors and distinguish them from more traditional approaches to law and

8

lawyering.

9

The dominant, traditional approach found in the profession usually downplays, if not

10

ignores these concerns. It does not value the emotional consequences of the outcomes and

11

processes involved in resolving legal matters or factors other than legal rights. Law schools

12

traditionally teach students to sift through facts and issues to eliminate “irrelevant” concerns and

13

focus only on what is “relevant” to the rule of law.18 The emotional and interpersonal dynamics

14

of a matter are deemed irrelevant to the pure legal analysis learned in the first year of law school.

15

Sometime during the third year of law school or first few years of practice, lawyers are left to

16

their own to rediscover their ability to evaluate these dynamics and somehow incorporate that

17

assessment into their work as lawyers, but this process (if it occurs) happens haphazardly and

18

without direction. It may not happen at all. For example, empirical research on lawyers

19

indicates that, compared to nonlawyers, lawyers tend to evaluate settlement options by focusing

20

solely on monetary value (the “economic bottom-line”), while nonlawyers tend to be much more

21

influenced by nonmonetary, psychological factors in their decisions to accept a settlement offer
18

Kerper, supra note 2, at 369.

5
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in a lawsuit.19 This suggests that instead of re-incorporating nonlegal factors into our

2

professional decisions, lawyers focus instead on pure legal analysis (who wins or loses) and the

3

economic bottom line (how much in damages will the winner receive).

4

Certainly, in law school, emotional and interpersonal concerns are strongly de-

5

emphasized, if not blatantly ignored. Empirical research indicates that law school actually

6

fosters two shifts in values that echo this de-emphasis. The first shift is away from what Carol

7

Gilligan calls an “ethic of care” and towards a “rights” or “justice” orientation.20 The care ethic

8

values interpersonal harmony, maintaining relationships, people's feelings and needs, and

9

preventing harm.21 In contrast, the “rights” or “justice” orientation focuses on rights, rules,

10

standards, individuality, independence, justice, fairness, objectivity, accomplishments,

11

ambitions, principles, personal beliefs, and freedom from the interference of others.22 During

12

law school, law students tend to either intensify their rights orientations or move from a care

13

ethic to a rights orientation.23

14

The second shift that occurs during law school is away from an emphasis on

15

“growth/self-acceptance, intimacy/emotional connection, and community/societal contribution,”

16

which have been called “‘intrinsic’ values,” and towards an emphasis on
19

Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the
Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997).
20
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). The ethic of care typically emphasizes interpersonal concerns
and is believed to be characteristic of women. Unsatisfied with the appropriateness of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory
of moral development to women, Gilligan and others performed research that found that women more often make
decisions out of an "ethic of care" while men more often decide on the basis of a "rights" orientation. See also Carol
Gilligan, Moral Orientation And Moral Development in E. F. KITTAY & D. T. MEYERS (EDS.), WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); Judith White & Chris Manolis, Individual Differences in
Ethical Reasoning Among Law Students, 25 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 19, 33 (1997) (briefly describing the
history of the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan).
21
Sandra Janoff, The Influences of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 219-22 (1991).
22
Id.
23
Id.
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“appearance/attractiveness,” “money/luxuries, popularity/fame, and beauty/attractiveness,” which have

2

been called “‘extrinsic’ value[s].”

24

3

Both shifts appear among law students as early as the first year of law school. In both

4

shifts, a movement away from valuing interpersonal harmony, connectedness, and emotional

5

wellbeing is evident. The comprehensive law movement values these concerns, in contrast. It

6

asks lawyers to focus on these concerns and issues that are traditionally ignored, if not actively

7

silenced, in law school and law practice. In this way, it differs from traditional approaches to

8

law and lawyering. While “good,” traditional lawyers may implicitly or unconsciously take

9

these concerns into account in their representation of clients, the comprehensive law movement

10

differs from traditional lawyering in that it explicitly values interpersonal, emotional,

11

psychological, and relational concerns. It elevates the importance of these concerns in the law

12

and seeks to consciously train lawyers to effectively deal with these concerns. The revolutionary

13

nature of the movement is thus evident. The next two sections explore the two unifying features

14

in more detail.

15

A.

16

Optimizing Human Wellbeing
First, the vectors of the comprehensive law movement seek legal solutions that make

17

things better, or at least not worse, for the people involved in the legal matter. They explicitly or

18

implicitly attempt to optimize the psychological and emotional wellbeing of the individuals

19

involved. All of the vectors seek to resolve the legal dispute or matter in a way that prevents

20

harm to, preserves, or enhances individuals’ interpersonal relationships, psychological wellbeing,
24

Lawrence S. Krieger, Psychological Insights: Why Our Students and Graduates Suffer, and What We Might Do
About It, 1 J. ASS’N LEG. WRITING DIRS. 259 (2002), and Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark
Side of Law School , and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC.
112 (March/June 2002).
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opportunities for personal growth, mental health, or satisfaction with the process and outcome of

2

the matter.25

3

While the vectors may initially focus on the wellbeing of the individual client at hand,

4

they often seek to preserve or enhance the wellbeing of all of the individuals involved in the

5

matter. They intuitively understand the well-known social science finding that positive

6

relationships and good connections with one’s family, friends, colleagues, peers, and community

7

lead to enhanced psychological wellbeing and functioning26 and, as a result, they often work to

8

preserve, maintain, restore, or create good interpersonal relationships.

9

Because of the emotional devastation that can result from traditional adversarial

10

litigation, many of the vectors explicitly seek nonlitigious solutions to legal problems.27 Some

11

vectors are explicitly therapeutic to the individuals involved28 and some are indirectly

12

therapeutic.29 Many utilize collaborative methods in solving legal problems;30 however, some

13

explicitly acknowledge that litigation, uncompromising positions, and legal force can themselves

14

be healing and they use these methods in achieving their goals.31

15

Social scientists might call this feature “optimizing human functioning.” They might

16

define the vectors’ goal as “satisfaction with the legal process” or “good mental health.”

17

Jurisprudents might call the goal therapeutic or curative. Others might describe the goal as a

18

search for healing or restoration. Native American tradition might call the goal “harmony” and

19

then define harmony as three-part wholeness, meaning harmony within oneself (intrapersonal
25

This focus echoes the overall values embedded in the paradigm shifts and jurisprudential precursors to
the movement discussed in Part IV., infra, such as connectedness, interpersonal harmony, and human wellbeing.
26
See Richard Sheehy & John J. Horan, Effects of Stress Inoculation Training for First-Year Law Students (August
2000) (paper presented at annual meeting of the American Psychological Association), available at
http://horan.asu.edu/d-rs-apa-y2k.htm (visited April 15, 2005).
27
E.g., preventive law, creative problem solving, collaborative law, procedural justice, and holistic justice.
28
Explicit: e.g., therapeutic jurisprudence, transformative mediation, and drug treatment courts.
29
Implicit: restorative justice.
30
See e.g., Tesler, supra note 1.
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harmony), harmony between self and a Supreme Being, if one so believes (vertical harmony),

2

and harmony between self and others (horizontal or interpersonal harmony).32 Whatever

3

moniker is used, the concept is focused first on people and second on leaving people in the best

4

possible internal, psychological, emotional, moral, relational, and spiritual state at the conclusion

5

of their legal matter.

6

B.

7

“Rights Plus:” Considering Extra-Legal Factors
The second unifying feature is that all of the vectors take into consideration, when

8

assessing or resolving a legal problem, more than just the strict legal rights, liabilities,

9

obligations, duties, and entitlements presented. While law school teaches us to focus only on the

10

law and what facts are relevant to the legal tests used in courts, the comprehensive law

11

approaches explicitly go above and beyond the law to incorporate a consideration of one or more

12

extra-legal factors. The factors considered include: the social, psychological, and emotional

13

consequences of various courses of action, the communities in which the individuals involved

14

exist, and the parties’ emotions, feelings, needs, resources, goals, psychological health,

15

relationships, values, morals, and financial concerns. 33 Pauline Tesler, one of the founders of the

16

collaborative law movement, calls this feature “rights plus.”34

17

Every traditional lawyer probably takes his or her client’s financial concerns into account, so

18

that at least one extra-legal factor is usually considered beyond the client’s legal rights or duties.35

19

In fact, focusing on the economic bottom line is rather characteristic of attorneys, as compared to
31

See e.g., Daicoff, AFTERWORD, supra note 1, reviewed in 87 A.B.A. J. 79 (May 2001).
Definition attributed to Dean Emeritus David Link formerly of Notre Dame Law School, now president of the
International Centre for Healing and the Law, formed under the auspices of the Fetzer Institute.
33
Daicoff, AFTERWORD, supra note 1, at 470-71.
34
This term was coined by Pauline Tesler, one of the co-founders of the collaborative law movement and a
collaborative divorce lawyer in the San Francisco area. Interview with Pauline H. Tesler, Esq., of Tesler, Sandmann
and Fishman, Dublin, Ireland (July 8, 1999).
32
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non-attorneys.36 Unlike a more traditional approach, however, the comprehensive law approaches

2

also consider the psychological, social, emotional, and relational consequences of various legal

3

courses of action.

4

These two main areas of common ground appear to be the unifying characteristics of the

5

otherwise somewhat diverse main vectors of the movement. Other features are shared by some but

6

not all of the vectors, such as: nonlitigative or collaborative approaches to dispute resolution, a

7

focus on spirituality and faith, explicitly therapeutic goals, interdisciplinary approaches, shared

8

equal power instead of a hierarchical top-down power structure, a focus on interpersonal

9

relationships, and a focus on process rather than outcome. However, the movement’s greatest

10

impact comes in its unifying features, not in its differences. The next section describes each of the

11

vectors in detail.

12

III. THE VECTORS

13

The vectors of the comprehensive law movement range from infinitely theoretical to

14

highly concrete. Professor David Wexler, one of the founders of therapeutic jurisprudence, has

15

noted that the most theoretical vectors can be thought of as “lenses” through which an attorney

16

can view a particular legal problem.37 These lenses help the attorney evaluate the problem as

17

well as potential solutions. The more concrete and tangible vectors provide specific “processes”

18

by which an attorney can resolve civil or criminal cases. The process-type vectors provide a

19

particular method for resolving civil or criminal lawsuits, while the lens-type vectors dictate how

20

an attorney might approach a case. For example, every legal process can be viewed from a
35

Most lawyers are likely to be finely attuned to the economics of a case, see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 74,
(empirical study finding that lawyers evaluated settlement options solely on the basis of economic return, while nonlawyers were swayed by noneconomic concerns such as fault, remorse and the price of the wrongdoing driver’s car).
36
Id.
37
Personal communication with David B. Wexler, John Lyons Professor of Law and Psychology, University of
Arizona College of Law and University of Puerto Rico School of Law, during 1999 or 2000.
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therapeutic jurisprudence perspective (Is this process therapeutic or not? How could it be made

2

so?), a procedural justice view (How will this process affect the participants psychologically?),

3

or a creative problem solving approach (Does this process allow for the broadest, most creative

4

approach to solving the problem?).

5

Until now, the legal system offered only one “lens,” the traditional approach to

6

lawyering. This lens typically focuses on legal rights, duties, and responsibilities and on

7

resolution of legal matters and disputes. The comprehensive law movement adds at least five

8

more “lenses.” Each of these new lenses focuses on concerns, beyond legal rights, through

9

which to view legal matters.

10

Despite perhaps being limited to one “lens,” the existing legal system offers a number of

11

“processes” which can be used to carry out the goals identified by the traditional “lens.” The

12

existing processes include: litigation, mediation (facilitative and evaluative forms thereof),

13

arbitration, private adjudications, private trials, and old-fashioned negotiation and settlement.

14

The comprehensive law movement adds at least five more “processes” to the lawyers’ toolkit,

15

each of which is consistent with a different paradigm for resolution of legal matters. These

16

lenses and processes will be individually examined, below.

17

A.

“Lenses”

18

1.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence

19

Therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) emerged around 1990 and now is represented by more

20

than five hundred and eighty one articles and eighteen books. Its cofounders, law professors

21

David Wexler and Bruce Winick, often define it by quoting law professor Christopher Slobogin's

22

definition of TJ: "the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice

11
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promotes the psychological or physical well-being of the people it affects.”38 Therapeutic

2

jurisprudence explicitly acknowledges, like it or not, that law, legal personnel, and legal

3

procedures have psychological effects upon the individuals and groups involved in each legal

4

matter. According to Professors Wexler and Winick, it asks, “whether the law’s antitherapeutic

5

consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating

6

due process and other justice values."39

7

Because it grew out of an interdisciplinary, law, and psychology viewpoint, they explain

8

that TJ was first applied to traditional mental health law topics such as “the civil commitment of

9

the mentally ill, the insanity defense, and incompetency in both civil and criminal contexts.”40

10

TJ has rapidly grown and spread into many other areas that include the civil commitment of

11

sexual offenders and outpatient drug abusers. TJ has also reached sentencing and probation

12

agreements, workers’ compensation law, sexual orientation law and disability law, fault-based

13

tort compensation schemes, domestic violence, crime victims, mandatory child abuse reporting,

14

contract law,41 and family law.42 TJ has even explored the therapeutic consequences of

15

practicing law upon lawyers.43

16

Importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to optimize the therapeutic effects of

17

substantive rules of law, legal personnel’s actions, and legal processes without elevating

18

therapeutic concerns over traditional legal concerns such as rights or due process. It simply says,
38

Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6, at xvii, in part quoting Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Five Dilemmas To Ponder, 1 PSYCH., PUB. POL. & L. 193 (1995) (reprinted in Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6,
at 775).
39
Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6, at xvii.
40
Id. at xix.
41
Id. at xvii, xix, and Table of Contents.
42
Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and
Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L. J.775 (1997) (proposing an interdisciplinary approach to resolving family law
issues).
43
Amiram Elwork, Ph.D. & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Ph.D., J.D., Lawyers in Distress, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205
(1995).
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given two different options for achieving a particular legal result, if one option is more

2

therapeutic than the other, the lawyer should attempt to pursue the more therapeutic course of

3

action.

4

For example, suppose that a mental health patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a

5

long-term treatment center for chemical dependency. Suppose also that this patient has the legal

6

right to receive a certain standard of care44 and is not receiving that care. The lawyer

7

representing this patient as a client might well proceed to bring legal action against the treatment

8

center in order to force the center to provide more appropriate care for the client. However, the

9

lawyer could either: (1) do this with the collaboration of and input from the client’s treatment

10

team, consisting probably of a unit director, psychiatrist, psychiatric nurse, and social worker or

11

mental health counselor, and maybe even with the involvement of and input from the client’s

12

family; or (2) do this alone with the client, following the client’s wishes. The legal result may be

13

the same in both situations; the client gets his or her legal standard of treatment care.

14

However, suppose that this particular client has been hospitalized many times before and

15

is quite belligerent and resistant to treatment. The client’s treatment team views the client’s

16

efforts to secure an attorney as simply more evidence of the client’s resistance to treatment and,

17

from a psychological perspective, as simply a diversion to allow the client to avoid making any

18

real positive changes in his or her life. In the first scenario, the lawyer is more likely to

19

accomplish the client’s legal goal in a way that allows the treatment team to assist the client in

20

gaining some psychological insights about why he or she is pursuing legal action. The lawyer

21

and the treatment team might actually be able to collaborate to achieve the legal goal while

22

making the process therapeutically meaningful for the client and thus enhancing his or her

23

treatment. The lawyer in the second scenario is more likely to work at cross purposes to the

13
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treatment, actually becoming a distracting influence on the client, and hampering any real

2

psychological progress the client is making in treatment. Given that both options are likely to

3

achieve the same legal result, the TJ-oriented lawyer might encourage the client to allow him or

4

her to pursue the first approach.45

5

TJ has been applied to employment law to argue that the Americans with Disabilities

6

Act’s provision requiring confidentiality of employee claims made pursuant to the Act is

7

countertherapeutic.46 Confidentiality deprives the claiming employee’s coworkers of an

8

opportunity to assist and cooperate in designing and implementing reasonable accommodations

9

for the employee’s disability. Coworker assistance and participation can reduce resentment

10

towards the accommodated employee, increase social support for the accommodation and the

11

accommodated employee, and maintain or increase overall workplace morale.

12

TJ has also been applied to the United States military’s policy on homosexuality of

13

“don’t ask, don’t tell and don’t pursue”47 to demonstrate the policy’s countertherapeutic aspects.

14

Under this policy, the armed services do not require applicants to disclose whether they are

15

homosexual or bisexual. The military will not discharge homosexual members unless

16

homosexual conduct is engaged in, but making a statement that one is homosexual or bisexual

17

constitutes “homosexual conduct.” Thus, a member of the armed forces who states that he or she

18

is gay or bisexual can be discharged from military service. However, no investigations or
44

Based on Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
This hypothetical is a composite of situations encountered by the author in her capacity as a former mental health
therapist in a substance abuse treatment center and the “Mr. A” case study in Robert D. Miller, Gary J. Maier,
Frederick W. Blancke and Dennis Doren, Litigiousness as a Resistance to Therapy, in DAVID WEXLER,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 332-35 (Carolina Academic Press 1990).
46
Rose Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89 (1994).
47
Kay Kavanagh, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L.
142 (1995) (reprinted in Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6, at 343).
45
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inquiries will be conducted solely to determine a member’s sexual orientation.48 From a TJ

2

perspective, Kay Kavanagh argues that this policy is countertherapeutic for homosexual service

3

members because, while it allows them to be homosexual, it requires them to refrain from

4

discussing their sexual orientation. It requires deception and prevents them from talking about

5

activities that would raise a presumption that they are engaging in homosexual acts. For

6

example, they cannot discuss with whom they spent the weekend, from whom they are receiving

7

a phone call, etc. This sets them apart from their colleagues and forces them to be emotionally

8

distant and isolated from their co-workers.49 It reduces the social support available to gay

9

service members, causes constant strain and tension in maintaining secrecy, causes distressing

10

isolation, and lowers self-esteem due to inauthenticity.50

11

TJ asks lawyers to beware of “psycho-legal soft spots,” which are, according to Bruce

12

Winick, areas “in which certain legal issues, procedures, or interventions may produce or reduce

13

anxiety, distress, anger, depression, hard or hurt feelings, and other dimensions of [emotional] ...

14

well-being.”51 For example, elderly clients may present developmental, end-of-life, health, and

15

family relationship concerns. Clients with terminal cancer or HIV/AIDS may present needs

16

relating to the dying process, the emotional stages of grief, and family relationships. Personal

17

injury clients may display anger, depression, and a desire for revenge. Their anger can be

18

misdirected onto the lawyer. They may need the opportunity to “tell their story” and be “heard.”

19

They may need to hear an apology from the defendant or need help to avoid becoming

20

emotionally “stuck” in the grief process. Domestic violence victims may need extra

21

understanding and support, suffer from low self-esteem, and have ambivalent feelings towards
48

Kay Kavanagh in Wexler & Winick, KEY supra note 6, at 346-50.
Id. at 352-356.
50
Id.
51
Bruce J. Winick, The Expanding Scope of Preventive Law, 3 Fla. Coastal Sch. L.J. 189, 195 n.15 (2002).
49
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the offender. A lawyer or judge who insists that a domestic violence victim be completely

2

finished with the relationship, or, at the other extreme, one who buys into the victim’s denial and

3

justification, can be countertherapeutic. For example, Kate Paradine relates a case in which the

4

lawyer told the victim that the perpetrator was behaving poorly because he “still loves you,” at a

5

time when she said she most needed to hear, “You don’t have to put up with that behavior.”52

6

Alcohol or drug dependent clients are likely to display denial, rationalization, and resistance and

7

they are prone to relapse. A TJ lawyer considers the effects of these potential issues, includes

8

them in lawyer-client discussions, and considers them in developing, with the client, a course of

9

action that is most likely to have the desired legal and therapeutic outcome.

10

TJ recognizes the often-devastating effects of protracted, costly, and adversarial litigation

11

as a “psycho-legal soft spot” and sometimes, therefore, seeks nonlitigation alternatives for

12

certain clients. For example, it is a known phenomenon that doctors are more likely to either

13

commit malpractice or have another malpractice action filed against them in the six months

14

following the filing of a malpractice suit against them.53 For this reason, a TJ defense lawyer

15

might use this social science insight to recommend a nonlitigated, immediate settlement of his or

16

her client’s first malpractice case to minimize the effect of this phenomenon on the doctor’s

17

medical practice.

18

In cases where ongoing relationships are key, a nonlitigated settlement may preserve the

19

interpersonal relationships between the parties and lead to a better overall outcome. For

20

example, a tenured professor who sues his or her school for gender discrimination may desire to
52

Kate Paradine, The Importance of Understanding Love and Other Feelings in Survivors’ Experience of Domestic
Violence, 37 CT. REV. 40 (Spring 2000).
53
Edward A. Dauer et al., Transformative Power: Medical Malpractice Mediations May Help Improve Patient
Safety, ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Spring 1999 at 9 (reviewing successful pilot malpractice mediation programs in
Massachusetts and Toronto). One wonders if perhaps the doctors’ confidence is shaken and they become more
prone to either mistakes or lawsuits as a result of the initial filing.

16

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

continue working there, post-lawsuit. A mediated resolution might preserve a better future

2

working relationship for employee and employer, and thus a better outcome for all involved, in

3

the long run.

4

Litigation itself, however, can at times be therapeutic. In cases that present a significant

5

power imbalance between the parties, such as a sexual harassment suit where the employer is

6

intractable, arrogant, and self-righteous and where the employee has a long history of

7

victimization, litigation may be the most therapeutic process for both parties. It could allow the

8

plaintiff to assert himself or herself, perhaps for the first time. It would also give the employer a

9

terrific “wake up call” which might force it to reassess its treatment of its employees and make

10

some positive changes.

11

TJ is probably the most visible and prolific vector, at least in academic and judicial

12

circles. It has rapidly spread to all areas of the law and has been enthusiastically adopted by

13

American judges in the form of “problem-solving courts.” (see part II, B. 4, infra).

14

2.

15

Preventive Law
Preventive law (“PL”) is perhaps the oldest vector of the movement. Preventive law

16

emerged in the 1950s, although its founder, attorney and law professor Louis Brown, conceived

17

of it in the 1930s. Its 1978 casebook, Planning by Lawyers, was revised and republished as a

18

preventive law textbook in 1997.54 The Preventive Law Reporter has been published since

19

1982.55

20

Preventive law attempts to avoid or prevent litigation before it arises. As a lens,

21

preventive law asks what measures can be put in place to prevent future litigation or future legal

22

problems. It takes a proactive approach and allows the attorney to intervene in clients’ lives
54

Hardaway, supra note 4.
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before problems arise. By anticipating disputes before they arise, planning ahead, and

2

intervening to prevent legal problems whenever possible, the lawyer serves the client’s interests

3

in a proactive, albeit nontraditional, way. The client may be spared the traumatizing effects of a

4

litigated confrontation with another person or legal entity. Preventive law also considers the fact

5

that interpersonal relationships, such as husband-wife or employer-employee, may endure long

6

after the current difficulty has passed, and a solution that irreparably ruptures the bond may lead

7

to future legal problems and thus be really no solution at all. The emphasis in preventive law is

8

on a good, ongoing lawyer-client relationship, open communication, and the prevention of legal

9

disputes.

10

For example, a preventive employment law attorney might assess a corporate client’s

11

employee policies and procedures manual and practices in order to assess whether the

12

corporation has any potential exposure to harassment or discrimination suits. Then, the PL

13

lawyer would put into place policies and procedures, perhaps including some in-service training,

14

if any “legal soft spots” emerged as a result of the lawyer’s “audit.” Periodic check ups would

15

be performed with the client to intervene proactively with any troubled employee/employer

16

situations.
Dean emeritus Edward Dauer gives this example:56 Suppose a mature gentleman comes

17
18

to see a lawyer about issuing some new shares of stock in the family corporation to his son-in-

19

law. It turns out that the amount of stock involved would allow the son-in-law to exercise some

20

influence over the direction of the business. In discussing the client’s intentions, the lawyer

21

realizes there are numerous risks the client may not have considered. Any competent lawyer

22

would investigate the statutory, regulatory, and tax liability implications of the transaction, as
55

The first volume of the PREVENTIVE LAW REPORTER was published in July 1982 (Butterworth Legal Publishers)
by the National Center for Preventive Law (U.S.), University of Denver, College of Law.
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well as issues of voting control, percentage ownership, and buy-sell agreements. Preventive law

2

would take the additional steps of anticipating and pre-empting opportunities for conflict, dashed

3

hopes, unfulfilled assumptions and damaged relationships. If, for example, the client and his

4

son-in law fail to get along after the stock is issued, their disagreements, frustrated expectations,

5

and conflicting interests may result in shareholder deadlock or even civil litigation, impacting the

6

family as well as the business.

7

Preventive law was recently integrated with therapeutic jurisprudence, melding its

8

processes and concepts with TJ’s therapeutic goals, in order to provide a richer approach to

9

practicing law.57 The integration of TJ and PL, collectively referred to as therapeutically-

10

oriented preventive law (“TOPL” or “TJ/PL”), merges the well-developed lawyering skills of PL

11

with the psychological sophistication of TJ. From this integration developed the concept of

12

lawyers foreseeing not just legal soft spots, but also “psycho-legal soft spots,” and acting to

13

prevent situations from occurring that were troublesome both legally and psychologically.58 To

14

effectively practice TJ/PL, a lawyer must employ excellent communications skills and

15

interpersonal sensitivity, as well as a familiarity with psychology.

16

3.

Procedural Justice

17

In 1990, social scientist Tom Tyler published an empirical study finding that litigants’

18

satisfaction with judicial processes depended more on three psychological factors than on the

19

actual win-lose outcome of the process.59 These three factors were: being given an opportunity

20

to speak and be heard; being treated with dignity and respect by the judge and the other legal

21

personnel; and how trustworthy those in authority appeared and behaved. Being allowed to
56

Stolle, et al., supra note 34, at 34-35.
Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15
(1997).
58
Id.
57

19

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

participate in the decision-making process and having the judge explain his or her reasons for

2

making his or her decision were also relevant to these factors and thus to litigants’ satisfaction.

3

In other words, whether these factors were present dictated how satisfied one was with a legal

4

process, regardless of whether one won or lost. Tyler concluded: “People’s evaluations of the

5

fairness of judicial hearings are affected by the opportunities which those procedures provide for

6

people to participate, by the degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and

7

respect, and by judgments about the trustworthiness of authorities. Each of these three factors

8

has more influence on judgments of procedural justice than do either evaluation of neutrality or

9

evaluations of the favorableness of the outcome of the hearing.”60 Procedural justice (“PJ”)

10

suggests that litigation in itself is not necessarily what people want from the law; they want a

11

voice, an opportunity to tell their story, to be treated with respect by the authority figures, and to

12

have the decision (if made by a third party) explained to them.

13

I typically use the following scenario to illustrate procedural justice concepts: If a sexual

14

harassment plaintiff brings a lawsuit against her former employer and ultimately receives back

15

pay and a fair damage award but is poorly treated by the judge, the attorneys, and the employer’s

16

representatives throughout the proceeding, the glow of the “win” is likely to fade substantially.

17

If she feels as if she was not given an opportunity to tell her story because of the restrictions

18

placed on witness’ testimony or if her credibility and character are impugned during cross-

19

examination in a way that leaves her feeling decimated afterward, and if she gets the impression

20

that the judge does not want her to speak freely, then she may feel violated by the process rather
59
60

Tyler in Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6, at 6-7.
Id. at 12.
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than vindicated. Tyler’s work would suggest that she would feel less satisfied, or even be

2

unhappy, with the outcome under these circumstances. 61

3

Another example can be seen in the treatment of a chronic substance-dependent man

4

who is facing sentencing for a minor, drug-related criminal offense. The sentence is likely to

5

consist of a multitude of measures, including mandatory inpatient and outpatient substance

6

abuse treatment, jail time, house arrest, community service, and community restitutionary

7

measures. It will likely take 18 months to complete. Wexler has applied Meichenbaum and

8

Turk’s empirical research on factors enhancing patients’ compliance with health care

9

professionals’ directions (i.e., “doctor’s orders”) to situations like this and concluded that this

10

man will be more likely to comply with the terms of his sentence if he is given a chance to

11

participate with the judge in the formulation of its terms, among other things.62 If he is given

12

a voice in the decisional process, is treated with dignity and respect by the judge and the

13

other legal personnel, and is given an explanation by the judge as to how he came to his

14

decision, he is more likely to “buy in” to the program and follow it. In the long run, this

15

approach will be more likely to facilitate this man’s successful recovery from substance

16

abuse.

17

Another example can be found in corporate hierarchical decision-making. Suppose

18

that a medium-sized corporation (without unionized employees) has just revised its

19

employment contracts with its employees, because it just concluded an expensive and painful

20

lawsuit with an ex-employee over the terms of her contract. In an effort to prevent future

21

lawsuits, the corporation unilaterally amends its annual employment contracts and policies

22

and procedures manual in order to minimize future disputes over its employment-related
61
62

DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF, supra note 1, at 179-80.
David Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1990).
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decisions, acting on the advice of its lawyer (who may even be practicing preventive law).

2

The employees receive the new contracts in the mail, with no explanation as to the changes.

3

They are furious, feel betrayed by the corporation, and perceive the new contracts as

4

undercutting their legal rights, to their detriment and to the corporation’s unilateral benefit.

5

Now the corporation has to engage in “damage control” to preserve the morale of its

6

employees. Procedural justice would have dictated that the corporation should have included

7

its employees or a representative group thereof in the process of revising the standard

8

employment contracts. If they had been involved in the process, understood the reasons for

9

the changes, were given a voice and an opportunity to be heard and to participate in revising

10

the contracts, they would have been more likely to accept the new contracts without question.

11

Morale and favorable employer-employee relations would have been preserved. Future

12

employee lawsuits might have been prevented.

13

Procedural justice alone is not a way of practicing law or administering justice, but its

14

insights have weighty consequences for lawyers, clients, and judges. It applies to and can

15

inform all of the approaches, traditional or comprehensive, to legal practice and the

16

administration of laws.

17
18

4.

Creative Problem Solving
Creative Problem Solving (“CPS”) refers to a broad approach to lawyering and legal

19

problems that takes into account a wide variety of non-legal issues and concerns and then seeks

20

creative, win-win solutions to otherwise win-lose scenarios. Its website explains that, “clients

21

and society are increasingly asking lawyers to approach problems [not always as fighters, but]

22

more creatively. The Center develops curriculum, research, and projects to educate students and

23

lawyers in methods for preventing problems where possible, and creatively solving those

22
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problems that do exist. The Center focuses both on using the traditional analytical process more

2

creatively and on using nontraditional problem solving processes, drawn from business,

3

psychology, economics, neuroscience, and sociology among others.”63

4

Law professor Linda Morton gives an example of how the principles of CPS can be

5

applied to and reinforced in other areas of the law school curriculum.64 She starts with the

6

common example given in Property class of the client who has been sued by a neighbor who is

7

claiming adverse possession:

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

The students' initial reaction might be to examine legal doctrine learned
through the study of appellate cases (e.g., Was there sufficient use of the
premises? Was the use permissive?). In teaching substantive law, this process
must be undertaken in order to learn both content and legal analysis.
However, analysis of the issue should not end there. A creative problem
solving paradigm can teach other methods that lawyers might use to resolve
the issue. In doing so, students would inevitably incorporate more humanistic
and creative concepts in their thinking. In using the model offered, students
would first have to identify the problem, taking into account interests and
needs of those involved (e.g., Is this a case of neighborhood hostility? Land
acquisition? What does the client want to happen? What can she afford?
How do her values and interests compete with others involved?).
Understanding the problem is the next step (e.g., What further research would
have to be undertaken? What other disciplines should be consulted? How
could the problem have been prevented?). Once the problem is thoroughly
understood, solutions, in addition to that of litigation, are posed (e.g., Can this
be resolved through a negotiation, mediation, or neighborhood coffee? Or
should the client simply sell the property? What are the possible results of
each?). After a full range of solutions is offered, the next step is to choose
among them, keeping in mind the effects of implementing each one (e.g., Who
decides? And, according to whose values? Who might be harmed?).
Ultimately, an analysis is required as to whether the "best" solution has been
chosen (e.g., Will such choice prevent future problems?). By framing class
discussion in a creative problem solving context, the student is exposed to a
much richer variety of approaches to the issue that legal analysis alone can
offer.65
63

CPS is associated with the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving at California Western School of Law
(website: go to http://cwsl.edu/main/home.asp , select Creative Problem Solving) (visited April 11, 2005), which
sponsors a number of law school courses on CPS, national and international projects, and periodic convergences.
64
Example and questions from Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34
CAL. W. L. REV. 375, 386-87 (1998).
65
Id.
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2

Law professor Janeen Kerper in her 1997 article on CPS and the famous Palsgraf

3

explosion-on-the-railroad-platform case gives the most vivid example of creative problem

4

solving.66 She asserts that in most first-year torts classes across the country, Cardozo’s opinion

5

in this case is analyzed as a “brilliant piece of legal reasoning,”67 deciding just how far liability

6

extends. In contrast, Kerper points out that the ultimate result of this famous torts case for Helen

7

Palsgraf was dismal if not devastating. From a CPS perspective, it is “an example of particularly

8

bad lawyering.”68 Not only did Mrs. Palsgraf lose the case on appeal, but she also had to pay her

9

own and the railroad’s attorneys’ fees. A single mother, struggling to provide for her children by

10

working two menial jobs, and suffering from a speech impediment as an after effect of the

11

incident that impaired her ability to work and communicate with her children, Mrs. Palsgraf was

12

ultimately held liable for costs roughly equivalent to a year’s earnings. Financially, she ended up

13

poorer as a result of the lawsuit and she achieved none of her nonlegal goals. Anecdotal

14

evidence suggests that she even became mute as a result of the lawsuit’s eventual outcome.69

15

Kerper re-evaluates Mrs. Palsgraf’s case from a creative problem solving standpoint and

16

contrasts what the CPS lawyer might do, with what her lawyer, Matthew Wood, did. For

17

example, solutions that would have addressed Mrs. Palsgraf’s physical problems, medical

18

expenses, limited employment opportunities, and childcare obligations might well have been

19

fashioned with the railroad’s concurrence. By “brainstorming” to identify mutually acceptable

20

alternatives to litigation, Mrs. Palsgraf’s attorney may have better served her needs. Indeed,

21

Kerper suggests, had Mrs. Palsgraf been afforded the opportunity to thoroughly explore her
66

Kerper, supra note 2.
Id. at 365.
68
Id.
69
Id.
67
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options and acknowledge her needs, she might have avoided the risks of a lengthy lawsuit that

2

ultimately left her worse, physically and financially, than when she started.70

3

5.

Holistic Justice

4

Holistic lawyering encompasses many forms of practice that would easily fit within some

5

of the other vectors, such as TJ or CPS. Holistic law or holistic justice (“HJ”) is hard to define

6

because it refers to a loose coalition of practicing lawyers in the United States and world who

7

embody a rather diverse set of approaches. Most see themselves as healers and peacemakers;

8

some focus more expressly on spiritual principles. HJ explicitly seeks to: “promote peaceful

9

advocacy and holistic legal principles; encourage compassion, reconciliation, forgiveness, and

10

healing; advocate the need for a humane legal process; contribute to peace building at all levels;

11

enjoy the practice of law; listen intentionally and deeply in order to gain complete understanding;

12

acknowledge the opportunity in conflict; and wholly honor and respect the dignity and integrity

13

of each individual.”71

14

Holistic lawyers often view the client’s situation as an opportunity for growth for both

15

the client and the lawyer, although they might be inclined to define growth along spiritual lines

16

rather than along psychological lines. Some explicitly hold that “everything happens for a

17

reason” and seek to find a greater purpose for or meaning in the legal problem or the interaction

18

of the lawyer and client. Some explicitly follow their own personal values in their professional

19

work and refuse to take actions that conflict with those personal values, always of course

20

discussing those actions and values with the client. Some try to elicit from their clients their

21

deepest desires, use the client’s heartfelt goal as the goal of the lawyer-client relation, and view

22

their role as helping the client achieve that deeper goal. Wall Street attorney Arnie Herz, who
70
71

Id. at 368-70
Website: http://iahl.org (visited April 11, 2005).

25

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

was profiled in the American Bar Association Journal in 200172, describes holistic practice well

2

when he gives this example of his lawyering work:

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Attorney Arnie Herz, for example, represented an imposing ex-football player we
shall call John Smalls, in a dispute with the new owners of the company Smalls
had just sold, after ten years of successful solo ownership. Smalls was furious
with the new owners’ treatment of him as employee post-sale and with their
mismanagement of the company. Unfortunately, he had signed a noncompete
agreement as part of the sale and felt bound by it, despite his frustration.
Determined to sue the new owners for mistreatment and mismanagement, he
approached Herz, who opined that a lawsuit might succeed but would cost well
over $100, 000 in fees and costs to litigate. Smalls was ready to move, but Herz
decided to slow him down a bit and asked, “If you could have anything you
wanted in your life, what would you want your life to look like six months from
now?” Smalls said more than anything, he wanted to be free of the new owners
and wanted to make more money. He thought he could make a lot more money
without them but didn’t want to “let them off the hook.” Frustrated that Herz was
trying to talk him out of suing, Smalls commented, “You’re too nice- I need a
tough litigator,” packed up, and started to walk out the office. Talking a big risk,
Herz responded, “I know you think I’m not tough, but in all my years of
experience, I think you may be the weakest person I’ve worked with. You set out
a vision that was to be free of these people—you didn’t mention that you wanted
to punish them, teach them a lesson, or spend $100,000 of your own money and
five years of your life doing so. What I see is that you don’t have the strength to
hold on to your own vision and deal effectively with your own anger. And I’ll bet
you’ve been doing this all your life.” At first Smalls flushed with anger. But
something in what Herz said rang true. He sat down and began listening and
discussing; together, they agreed on a plan of action that involved a more
collaborative, nonlitigious approach to resolving the matter. Smalls was freed
from his noncompete clause three months later. The new owners teetered on the
edge of bankruptcy for years—as Herz had predicted; even had Smalls sued, he
would not have been able to collect a dime. Freed of the new owners, Smalls was
in fact able to make a lot more money. Financially, the plan was a huge success.
Personally, Smalls later said, the process of resolving this legal matter had
allowed him to learn how his anger had been controlling his life, affecting his
relationship with his wife and his kids, and blocking him from his full potential.
Herz’s approach to representing Smalls is one illustration of how a
comprehensive lawyer might conduct such a law practice. Herz went beyond the
law to ask about the client’s deepest needs, goals, and desires and then used that
information to create, with the client, the best strategy. Admittedly, he took a
major risk early in the lawyer-client relationship, and not all comprehensive
lawyers would be comfortable doing so. Using excellent interpersonal skills,
though, Herz assessed that Smalls was a no-nonsense person who would respond
72

Steven Keeva, What Clients Want: People Who Come to Arnie Herz Seeking Legal Help Leave With Some
Unexpected Solutions, 87 A.B.A.J. 48 (June 2001).
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6

only to straight talk—which he did. Litigation in this case only would have
wasted time and money and fueled the client’s excessive anger. The final process
and outcome were not only financially successful but also personally and
emotionally beneficial for Smalls.73
B.

7

Processes: The Process-Type Vectors
Approximately four of the vectors consist of concrete processes for lawyering or dispute

8

resolution, rather than the broad, general, approaches to law and law practice embodied by the

9

lens-type vectors. These are collaborative law, transformative mediation, restorative justice, and

10

problem-solving courts. Each is examined in turn, below.

11

1.

12

Collaborative Law
Collaborative law (“CL”) is a non-litigative method for resolving divorce and custody

13

actions that allows the clients and their attorneys control over the resolution, without a third-

14

party decision-maker.74 It originated among practicing family lawyers who were seeking a

15

better, less emotionally damaging, more economical way for divorcing spouses to resolve their

16

differences.

17

create more animosity between the divorcing spouses and harm family relationships. This is in

18

part because the traditional approach takes people whose behavior and emotional state are at

19

their worst and then engages them in an adversarial process. If the clients’ attitudes indicate that

20

they are appropriate for a collaborative process, collaborative law allows the ex- or divorcing

The theory is that the traditional methods of resolving family law disputes often

73

Susan Daicoff, Resolution Without Litigation: Are Courtrooms Battleground For Losers?, GP SOLO, Oct./Nov.
2003 at 45-46.
74
Tesler, supra note 1; see also Pauline H. Tesler & Peter B. Sandmann, Ten Questions For Clients Weighing
Litigation v. Collaborative Law, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 11 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative
Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 403 (2002); Pauline H.
Tesler, The Basic Elements of Collaborative Law, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 9 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler,
Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967 (1999); Pauline H.
Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Family Law Attorneys Need to Know About It, 13 AM. J. FAM. L.
215 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Approach to Family Law ADR, 2 CONFLICT MGMT. 12
(1996); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law Neutrals Produce Better Resolutions, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST
LITIG. 1 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, Client Relations: Tips From a Collaborative Practitioner, 21 ALTERNATIVES
HIGH COST LITIG. 13 (2003).
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spouses and their attorneys to meet in a series of four-way conferences outside of court to resolve

2

the issues in divorce and custody cases. The attorneys and clients work together in a

3

collaborative atmosphere with a foundation of mutual, contractual agreement to the process and a

4

commitment to participate in good faith. CL offers the opportunity for divorcing spouses to

5

dissolve their marriages with less anger, hostility, cost, time, and negative emotion than result

6

from most litigation processes. Through the CL process, they can also begin to develop a

7

workable, cooperative post-divorce relationship that may be useful if they must continue to co-

8

parent children in the future.

9

The main features distinguishing CL from simple mediation or negotiation are the six-

10

way communication (among and between the two spouses and two lawyers), the parties’

11

commitment to the CL process, and the binding agreement of the attorneys to withdraw if the

12

parties go to court. No formal litigation is usually instituted until settlement is reached. There is

13

a strong psychological component to the lawyer-client relationship in that emotions, needs,

14

transference, etc. are openly acknowledged and dealt with in order to maximize the results of the

15

4-way conferences. According to one of the two co-founders, attorney Pauline Tesler, one of the

16

most important features of CL is the fact that the attorneys are contractually forbidden from

17

representing their clients in court should the collaborative process break down. This feature

18

aligns the attorneys’ financial interests with that of their clients’ and greatly incentivizes the

19

attorneys to work towards creative solutions to the outstanding issues. Without this, the

20

attorneys can easily lapse into, “Why worry if my client is misbehaving or the clients aren’t

21

agreeing? I get paid either way.” Attorney Tesler maintains that this feature produces

22

unprecedented creativity and resolutionary energy in both attorneys and clients.75 This contrasts
75

Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967
(1999).
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with the usual process, where the lawyers simply litigate if negotiations break down, thus they

2

collect a fee and thereby “win,” whether or not the clients settle.

3

In a collaborative divorce process, the lawyer first assesses, with the client, the

4

appropriateness of the client for a collaborative process. The client must be able to deal

5

effectively with his or her negative emotions (what Tesler calls the client’s “shadow self”) and

6

must be able to negotiate with honesty and in good faith with his or her spouse. Second, the

7

lawyers create in the four-way conferences what psychologists might recognize as a container, or

8

safe space, within which conflicts and issues between the spouses can be aired and resolved.

9

Establishing ground rules, guidelines, boundaries, and consequences of inappropriate behavior

10
11

by a participant creates this “container.”76
One example that founders and attorneys Pauline Tesler and Stewart Webb have used in

12

their trainings is the hypothetical “Henry/Ruth” divorce. In this case, Henry has a Type “A”

13

personality and is very organized and conscientious, but a bit controlling. Ruth has been a

14

homemaker for years but is now living on her own and making her way, financially. Henry and

15

Ruth have been married for 20 years and have one 17-year-old son, Justin, who is currently being

16

treated in-patient for drug and alcohol abuse. Ruth has moved out of the house into her own

17

apartment and begun working part-time. Henry is providing her with spousal support that is

18

inadequate, as it is below the statutory guidelines in amount. Because they have seen so many of

19

their friends go through agonizing, lengthy, costly divorces, they elect to use collaborative law

20

attorneys for theirs. Henry and Ruth, despite their differences, some distrust, and a bit of

21

hostility, both agree that for Justin’s sake, this process needs to be as amicable and cooperative

22

as possible. They agree that they need to resolve their differences and come to agreement on

23

property division, child and spousal support, and custody in an amicable fashion, in order to
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maximize their son’s chances of success in his treatment program and in the future. However,

2

they are not in agreement on all of the financial issues. Despite their disputes over money, they

3

are ultimately able to resolve the issues, divide their property, develop a plan for Justin, and

4

agree on spousal and child support, in a series of four-way conferences involving Henry, Ruth,

5

and their respective attorneys. The process takes four months and costs about a fourth of what a

6

traditional uncontested divorce would cost in legal fees and costs. At the end of the process, the

7

parties attach their signed agreement to their petition for dissolution, file it, and are promptly

8

divorced. The attorneys and the spouses agree at the outset to honor the specific guidelines of

9

the CL process, which includes a contractual undertaking by the attorneys to withdraw from

10

representation if the process breaks down and the parties end up litigating the issues. Neutral

11

third-party evaluators are agreed to, engaged, and used to explore and help resolve the

12

psychological and financial issues involved in Henry and Ruth’s lives. Full and honest

13

disclosure of assets and financial matters is required. In the four-ways, communication flows in

14

six directions, between all members of the four-party conference. Between the four-ways, the

15

attorneys and their clients talk, the two clients may talk, and the two attorneys talk.
CL has spread rapidly to many metropolitan areas in the United States.77 Groups of

16
17

specially trained lawyers in these areas offer CL processes to divorcing spouses, as long as the

18

opposing side’s attorney is also trained in the CL process. In 1997, Pauline Tesler conducted a

19

training session at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association and, in 2001, the

20

American Bar Association published her practice-oriented book, Collaborative Law.78 CL may

21

eventually be expanded into other areas of law, such as employment law disputes.
76

Id.
See, e.g., http://www.collaborativefamilylawfl.com/index.html and http://www.collaborativelawsf.com/ (regional
CL websites for South Florida and San Francisco).
78
Tesler, supra note 53.
77
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2.

2

Transformative Mediation
Transformative mediation (“TM”) is a form of mediation that emerged in the 1990s. Its

3

founder, law professor R. Baruch Bush, co-authored a 1994 book79 with communications

4

professor Joseph Folger, in which they explain that transformative mediation differs substantially

5

from traditional mediation (both the facilitative and evaluative forms) in both its goals and

6

process. Unlike traditional mediation, which focuses on dispute resolution, transformative

7

mediation focuses less on the outcome of the mediation or the solution to which the parties

8

agree, and more on how the process of mediation might change the individuals involved.

9

Specifically, transformative mediation seeks to foster a sense of “empowerment” and the

10

experience of “recognition” in each of the parties. Empowerment, as defined by Bush and

11

Folger, means the parties grew in maturity by developing and owning their own solution. It does

12

not refer to the experience of having a third party enforce one’s rights; instead, it refers to an

13

internal condition in which the person feels more capable of solving his or her problems.80

14

Recognition, as defined by Bush and Folger, means that it resembles a feeling of empathy

15

for another person, in which one person is able to “stand in the shoes” of the other and see the

16

matter from another’s perspective.81 It often results in feelings of compassion for the other and

17

in its finest form, culminates in forgiveness. Once a party can experience recognition, the next

18

goal is for that party to communicate those insights or feelings to the other party. This is called

19

“giving recognition.”82 Bush and Folger explain that the ability to see a matter from the other

20

person’s standpoint is a mark of personal growth, just as rigid egocentrism is a measure of
79

ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
80
Id. at 89-94.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 96.
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emotional immaturity.83 Transformative mediation thus explicitly seeks to foster personal and

2

moral growth in the parties as its goal, rather than the resolution of the dispute, which is

3

secondary in importance to growth.84

4

TM views conflict as a destabilizing “crisis in human interaction”85 rather than a

5

violation of rights or conflict of individual interests. Its three-person mediations seek to restore

6

balance between self and other, transform conflict into a positive, constructive process, and

7

encourage parties to do two things: (1) regain their sense of strength and self-confidence (the

8

“empowerment” shift); and (2) expand their responsiveness to each other (the “recognition”

9

shift). By focusing on these goals, the parties are moved towards increased personal

10

development and enhanced personal and interpersonal skills.86
Bush and Folger use the example of the “Sensitive Bully” to illustrate TM.87 In this case,

11
12

Charles, a young man, is charged with assault and battery of an adolescent, Jerome. Jerome’s

13

father, Regis, an imposing, stern African-American man, who enters mediation visibly angry,

14

accompanies Jerome to the mediation. Charles, in contrast, appears undefensive, quiet, and even

15

cowed. Charles is contrite and ashamed of what he has done. However, Regis begins with a very

16

aggressive and unforgiving attitude towards what Charles has done to his son. The mediator asks

17

Regis and Charles to take turns describing what happened. Charles is a young, slight, African

18

American man who walks with a limp. Charles routinely cut through Jerome’s neighborhood on

19

his way from the bus stop to see his girlfriend, and Jerome and his friends routinely “razzed”

20

Charles as he passed. The two had had verbal altercations before the incident. On this occasion,
83

Id. at 92.
Id. at 81-84, 87.
85
Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and
Practice of Transformative Mediation, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 72 (2002).
86
Id. at 82-83.
87
Bush & Folger, supra note 52, at 5-11.
84
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Jerome was with a group of his friends when the dispute arose. On this day, Jerome took it a bit

2

far with his verbal insults and Charles physically assaulted Jerome. Charles finally snapped and

3

retaliated, albeit inappropriately. Through this mediation, Regis realizes that his son, Jerome,

4

and his friends had been making fun of Charles’ physical disability and that, finally, Charles

5

couldn’t take it anymore. Once Regis realizes this, he scolds his son for making fun of Charles.

6

He gives “recognition” by telling Charles he understands “how cruel kids can be.” Charles

7

explains that all he wants to do is see his girlfriend and he is happy to walk a different route

8

through the neighborhood. By subtly focusing on Charles’ physical condition, the content of the

9

verbal interactions between Charles and Jerome pre-assault, and how each party’s comments in

10

the mediation had affected the other, the mediator was able to elicit what TM calls “recognition,”

11

a sort of empathy or standing in the other’s shoes, from both Charles and Regis. Each was able

12

to appreciate the other’s feelings and motivations. Then, by having the parties jointly develop

13

the solution to the problem, the mediator facilitated what TM calls “empowerment.” The parties

14

worked together to develop a way that Charles can walk through Jerome’s neighborhood without

15

encountering Jerome and his friends. The mediator does not offer or impose a solution for the

16

future, but encourages the parties to work it out themselves.

17

TM has been a bit controversial in its explicit goals and methods. It is part of the CL

18

movement because it seeks to improve the relational, moral, and personal functioning of the

19

parties involved, in the resolution of legal disputes. It focuses explicitly on processes that can

20

foster growth in the parties’ ability to communicate, understand each other, solve their own

21

problems, resolve conflicts, and interact with other people.

22

3.

Restorative Justice
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Restorative justice (“RJ”) is a widespread movement in the criminal justice area that has

2

been steadily growing since the mid-1980s. RJ seeks to restore the relationship between the

3

criminal offender and his or her community and seeks to restore harmony. It does this through

4

dialogue, negotiation, problem solving for the future, and an emphasis on the offender’s

5

acceptance of accountability to his or her victim and to the community. RJ is seen in almost

6

every jurisdiction in the United States, in many forms, such as: teen court, victim-offender

7

mediation, reparative probation programs, and community parole boards. RJ is particularly

8

popular for use in the U. S. with juvenile offenders, due to its reliance on the pressure brought

9

to bear on the offender by peers, family, and community members and its resultant potential for

10

rehabilitating juvenile offenders. However, it is even more widely used in Australia, Canada,

11

and the United Kingdom, extending even to use in sentencing adult offenders. Outside the

12

American criminal justice system, RJ forms include collaborative forms of adjudication and

13

sentencing, such as circle sentencing and family group conferences, that actually substitute for

14

prosecution, trial, and sentencing.

15

In RJ, the community, victim, and offender, in a collaborative process, participate in

16

some form in criminal adjudications or criminal sentencing. It may be as simple as post-

17

sentencing victim-offender mediation or as complicated as sentencing that is done in a

18

community, “circle” conference with all parties present. It usually relies on some sort of

19

conference, which can be as small as a three-person mediation between the victim and the

20

offender, or as large as a community-wide circle sentencing process that utilizes community or

21

peer pressure brought to bear on the offender. This interpersonal or public pressure is designed

22

to produce ‘therapeutic shame,” which facilitates responsibility-taking, accountability, and

23

personal growth and development in the offender. It emphasizes restitution and relationships
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between the offender, victim, and community instead of a top-down, hierarchical system

2

focused on imposing punishment.

3

Peacemaking at the University of Minnesota School of Social Work explains that:

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

The website for The Center for Restorative Justice &

[t]hrough restorative justice, victims, communities, and offenders are placed in
active roles to work together to. . . Empower victims in their search of closure;
Impress upon offenders the real human impact of their behavior; Promote
restitution to victims and communities. Dialogue and negotiation are central to
restorative justice, and problem solving for the future is seen as more important
than simply establishing blame for past behavior. Balance is sought between
the legitimate needs of the victim, the community, and the offender that
enhances community protection, competency development in the offender, and
direct accountability of the offender to the victim and victimized community.”88

13
14

In the United States in particular, RJ principles have been added to traditional criminal

15

justice processes as an enhancement, rather than as a substitute for existing criminal law

16

procedures. This allows for full preservation of the constitutional rights of the accused and

17

procedural due process, which are particularly important in U.S. criminal law. For example, in

18

the domestic violence area, restorative justice principles might dictate that domestic violence

19

victims should have more input into the proceedings, that the state should attempt to restore

20

victims to their former state through compensation and economic and social support, that victims

21

need varied support to become independent, that offenders should be held accountable, required

22

to make amends, required to participate in rehabilitation programs and reintegrated into the

23

community, and that the community should be more involved and responsible for assisting the

24

victim, the offender, and their family through the process of solving the problem.89

88

The website is http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/ (visited April 11, 2005).
Randall B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT.
REV. 28, 35-36 (Spring 2000) (discussing the creation of specialized domestic violence courts employing a
therapeutic or restorative approach).
89
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Victim-offender mediation is a specific, direct RJ “process.” Writer Barbara Stahura
relates this story:90

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

One evening in July, 1998, Terri Carlson and her husband
were walking home along the side of the road from the annual
community festival in Byron, Minnesota, when a four-wheel-drive
pickup truck going about 55 swerved, hitting and killing Terri’s
husband and injuring Terri. The 25-year-old driver, Eric, was a
deputy county sheriff, whose blood alcohol level was 50% over the
minimum for drunk driving. Yet Terri felt badly for him. She
herself had occasionally driven drunk. She said, “He was only 25.
… just a baby. He had lost everything he’d committed to in his
profession.” When he received a 44-month sentence, despite her
request to give him 10 years’ probation and community outreach,
she felt “further violated.” She packed up her three children and
moved to Oregon, but upon finding out about restorative justice,
she and Eric began a process designed to reconcile and resolve
what had happened. It took a year of preparation and individual
meetings with the mediator before they were ready to meet
together with the mediator. In that meeting, “they had a warm and
honest talk, even laced with laughter, and reached an agreement.”
Terri promised to help Eric reintegrate himself back into the Byron
community. They agreed to speak jointly to schools, community
groups, and the city council about how to prevent what happened.
And they agreed that Eric should speak to Terri’s three children
about the death of their father.91
This is a vibrant and stirring example of restorative justice at work. In the United States,

28

as this story illustrates, restorative justice is most often a post-sentencing process designed to

29

bring about reconciliation between the victim, offender, and community, resolution for all, and

30

reintegration of the offender into the community. With teenage offenders, it is often used for

31

sentencing of minor crimes. However, it is equally useful to bring healing to victims of serious

32

crimes, their offenders, and the communities in which they live. In other legal systems, such as

33

in Native American and aboriginal settings, restorative justice is used even for sentencing of

34

adult crimes. These “circle sentencing conferences” are used to discuss the event, air feelings,
90

Barbara Stahura, Trail ‘Em, Nail ‘Em, and Jail ‘Em: Restorative Justice, SPIRITUALITY & HEALTH, Spring, 2001
at 43.
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and sentence the offender via a collaborative, community-wide process including the offender,

2

victim, their friends and families, and their surrounding communities. RJ allows the victim to

3

ask questions, express feelings, and reach resolution about the event. It also allows the offender

4

to experience “therapeutic shame,”92 accept appropriate personal responsibility for his or her

5

actions, and perhaps even apologize, thus possibly leading to changed behavior.

6

4.

7

Problem Solving Courts
A parallel shift has occurred in the court system, mainly due to judges’ interest in

8

therapeutic jurisprudence. A number of specialized, “problem solving” courts (“PSCs”) have

9

been established, based on TJ principles.93 Their approach to judging is long-term, relational,

10

interdisciplinary, and focused on healing. Examples of these courts are drug treatment courts,

11

mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and unified family courts, which focus on

12

treating and resolving the interpersonal and psychological issues underlying the legal problems

13

rather than on punishing defendants or assigning fault. The following chart compares traditional

14

adjudication with the general approach taken by these problem solving courts:

15

A COMPARISON OF TRANSFORMED AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSES94

16

Traditional Process

Transformed Process

17

Dispute resolution

Problem-solving dispute avoidance

18

Legal outcome

Therapeutic outcome

19

Adversarial process

Collaborative process

91

Id.
Scheff, supra note 10.
93
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003).
94
Roger K. Warren, Reengineering the Court Process, Madison, WI, Presentation to Great Lakes Court Summit,
September 24-25, 1998.
92

37

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

Claim- or case-oriented

People-oriented

2

Rights-based

Interest- or needs-based

3
4

Emphasis placed on adjudication

Emphasis placed on post-adjudication and alternative
dispute resolution

5

Interpretation and application of law

Interpretation and application of social science

6

Judge as arbiter

Judge as coach

7

Backward looking

Forward looking

8

Precedent-based

Planning-based

9

Few participants and stakeholders

Wide range of participants and stakeholders

10

Individualistic

Interdependent

11

Legalistic

Common-sensical

12

Formal

Informal

13

Efficient

Effective

14

Drug treatment courts have rapidly proliferated throughout the United States since the

15

first one was implemented in Miami, Florida, in 1989. Their success rates have drawn attention

16

and propelled their implementation in other jurisdictions across the country.95 Statistics show
95

Alex Segura, Jr., “Alumni’s return shows success of drug court,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Thursday, August 9,
2001 at 10B (noting that the Fort Lauderdale, Florida court was the third in the nation, established in 1991, after
those in Miami and Las Vegas). In 2001, it was estimated that there were 660 drug courts “in 48 states, as well as
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, a number of Native American Tribal Courts, and one federal district
court, according to the Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of Justice,” according to Jan Pudlow,
“Palm Beach County opens its drug court,” The Florida Bar News, April 15, 2001 at 14 (noting also that Miami
(Dade County)’s drug court opened in 1989). Pudlow also reported a 70% success rate. Id.
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that up to 80% of incarcerated individuals may be suffering from substance abuse.96 Where

2

substance abuse is involved, courts may offer an offender a choice of traditional criminal

3

prosecution or participation in a drug treatment court (“DTC”). The goals of drug treatment

4

court are to reduce repeated criminal behavior, avoid the costs of incarceration, and rehabilitate

5

the offender, thereby ultimately benefiting the community. DTCs can be implemented either

6

pre-plea or post-plea. An offender must voluntarily enter into a formal contract that explains the

7

conditions of DTC participation, which typically include frequent court appearances,

8

participation in a drug rehabilitation program, close supervision, and drug screens. If the

9

offender is a juvenile, then the offender’s parents must sign the contract as well.

10

Treatment is monitored by regular appearances before a DTC judge. Mandatory court

11

appearances are weekly, then fortnightly, and finally monthly. The treatment “team” usually

12

consists of the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, drug treatment court

13

coordinator, treatment provider, and community-policing officer. Typical terms of a contract

14

include regular attendance at recovery fellowship meetings, interactions with a mentor already in

15

the recovery program, participation in the recovery program with the mentor, compliance with

16

routine check-ins with the DTC coordinator or case manager, random urine tests, and perfect

17

attendance at court appearances. If an offender fails to comply with the terms of the contract, the

18

offender faces a number of graduated, intermediate sanctions. Repeated failures can eventually

19

lead to explusion from the DTC and a return to traditional court for prosecution, trial, or

20

sentencing (depending on whether the diversion to DTC occurred pre- or post-plea). Program

21

completion depends on individual progress, usually between 14 and 24 months, after which a
96

Judge William G. Schma, Alternatives for the Common Good, 85 A.B.A. J. 103, 103 (June 1999) (according to
statistics from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, alcohol and drugs

39

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

joyous “graduation ceremony” is held and the originating charges are dismissed. Offenders

2

sometimes ask that the arresting officer be present at graduation, out of gratitude for the officer’s

3

intervention in their lives.97

4

The DTC approach to adjudication modifies judicial rules, procedures, and communication

5

postures. DTC team members attempt to collaborate with their clients to develop a flexible and

6

realistic treatment strategy and a changed lifestyle for the client. The offender is recast into the

7

role of a client, a term of respect and equanimity. The judge is required to have the temperament

8

and technique to serve as a team player or coach, mediating differences, coordinating styles, and

9

encouraging the client to recover. The judge no longer needs to referee the attorneys who

10

collaborate for the client’s benefit and accountability. The judge’s role shifts from a neutral

11

arbiter to that of the central figure in the team, a “cheerleader,” and a “stern parent.”98 The

12

attorneys cease gamesmanship and behave like partners for a common client, tailoring remarks

13

and input to support the client’s adherence to a treatment plan. Treatment professionals report on

14

the client’s recovery progress, not the need for perfection. Emphasis is placed on positive

15

behavior change by confirming client strengths. Sanctions for non-compliance are imposed to

16

obtain compliance for treatment and recovery, not for punishment reasons. When intermediate

17

sanctions are necessary, the entire team evaluates what needs immediate attention, discusses the

18

best way to accomplish the goals, and then comes to a collaborative resolution. In the case of
are implicated in 80 percent of incarcerations). On one criminal docket in Judge Schma’s court, 24 out of 27 felony
defendants had a history of addiction to alcohol or drugs, or mental illness or both.
97 David S. Hobler, Drug Treatment Court: The Making of Judicial Capital – Collaborative, Therapeutic, and
Preventive Practices (unpublished manuscript, 2001); see also National Drug Court Institute, Ethical Considerations
for Judges and Attorneys in Drug Court (May, 2001), published with the cooperation of the Drug Courts Program
Office of the United States Department of Justice (setting forth an interpretation of the American Bar Association
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, for those attorneys and judges practicing in drug court).
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juvenile offenders, parents, school representatives, and concerned significant adults attend court

2

and contribute to the solution as team members. The future of drug treatment courts appears

3

sound; their reported success rates are impressive99 and their effect on judges’ satisfaction has

4

been remarkable.100

Other problem solving courts, such as mental health courts,101 domestic violence courts,

5
6

and unified family courts,102 have processes similar to the drug treatment court procedures.

7

Domestic violence courts (“DVC”) have had mixed success.103 DVCs place the offender into a

8

treatment program much like a DTC, but also combine the criminal domestic violence action

9

with a civil protective order for the victim, and can address other legal needs of the family, such

10

as those involving family law, custody, visitation, and child support. It consolidates the court

11

interaction for the victim and family, providing one-stop shopping rather than several trips to

12

more than one court and related offices. Overall, there appear to be mixed results. Even though

13

the focus is on the victim, the process has been described as being time-consuming and

14

inefficient and often not well-received by judges, prosecutors, and the existing system.104

98

Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 477-83 (1999).
99
Jan Pudlow, “Palm Beach County opens its drug court,” The Florida Bar News, April 15, 2001 at 14, reporting
that, of the 100,000 drug dependent criminal offenders who have entered drug court, 70% were either still enrolled
or had graduated, which was, according to Pudlow, “more than double the rate of traditional treatment programs
retention rates,” citing statistics from the Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of Justice. Id.
100
Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction,
37 CT. REV. 12 (2000) (reporting the results of an empirical study on the positive effects on judges of judging in
problem solving courts).
101Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Solutions for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Justice System: A Symposium
Introduction (National Symposium on Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System), 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 901
(2004). This entire symposium issue is devoted to articles on mental health courts.
102
Michael A. Town, The Unified Family Court: Preventive, Therapeutic, and Restorative Justice for America’s
Families, NCJFCJ (Winter, 2002), at 14-17.
103
Fritzler and Simon, supra note 61.
104
Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements On An Effective Innovation,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000).
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Judge William Schma, of Michigan’s Ninth Judicial Circuit, provides two examples of the

2

effectiveness of drug treatment courts and mental health courts in criminal cases involving drug

3

addiction and mental illness, respectively:

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Mark, a drug addict, was arrested for selling crack cocaine. He was placed on lifetime
probation but kept using. Besides facing 20 years in prison (at a cost of $20,000 to
$25,000 per year), he was dying from kidney failure but could not stay clean long enough
to undergo a transplant procedure. Despite these obstacles, Mark was enrolled in a drug
court program. A team I supervised directed his recovery through regular court visits,
treatment and case management. Now, for the first time in a life of substance abuse,
Mark is clean and crime-free. And he is ready for his transplant.

11

....

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

When Melvin came to court he was out of control. A paranoid schizophrenic on lifetime
probation for delivery of cocaine, he had stopped taking his medication and had been
arrested. As deputies led him out of the courtroom, he shouted to me, “You’re a whitescum son of a bitch. You haven’t heard the last of this.” The exasperated probation
agent was prepared to recommend prison. But when Melvin’s attorney, family and
probation agent agreed to cooperate, I delayed disposition of the violation. Melvin was
released to the custody and supervision of family and the probation department. He
resumed treatment, counseling and his medication, and he was placed on electronic
monitoring. Today Melvin is stabilized and has a standing, informal visit with me every
other Tuesday. The last time he brought along his toddler son and spoke enthusiastically
of his hopes for the boy’s future. When Melvin leaves, we shake hands.105

23

Among practicing attorneys, problem solving courts, restorative justice, and

24

collaborative law have perhaps been the most visible vectors to date. The next section explores

25

why comprehensive approaches are rapidly growing at this particular time. It examines

26

developments within the legal profession, society in general, and the world that may be

27

precursors of the comprehensive law movement.

105

Schma, supra note 67.
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IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS,

2

PHILOSOPHICAL PRECURSORS AND PROPELLERS,

3

AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

4

Several philosophical shifts have occurred in recent decades, perhaps paving the way for

5

the emergence of comprehensive law approaches within the legal profession. Some of these are

6

global and societal in nature and not limited to law. Others exist entirely within the legal

7

profession. This Section will explore what led up to the comprehensive law movement and why

8

it developed now.

9

A.

10

Philosophical Shifts in Society
First, the globalization of the world, hastened by technological advances and worldwide

11

environmental concerns, has made the world smaller. Other cultures and countries have become

12

more accessible and “real.” Environmental problems have made us more dependent upon other

13

countries and have forced us to collaborate with them in order to solve imminent global

14

environmental concerns that threaten our way of life. For example, once we realized that toxic

15

dumping in the United States creates a hole in the ozone layer over another country that in turn

16

affects our supply of a particular good produced elsewhere, we began to realize that we were not

17

and could not remain isolated from the rest of the world. In turn, we have gained an awareness

18

that “we are all in this together” and that cooperation is necessary in order for us to thrive and

19

prosper in the future. Also, in the last decade of the 1990s, partly as a result of the end of the

20

Cold War, there may have been a decline in the prominence of a polarized, adversarial, “us and

21

them” mentality in which we viewed other people, other countries, and other cultures as enemies

22

to be feared and avoided.106 We found ourselves collaborating with countries and people we

23

formerly viewed as hostile and intractable. These developments, then, may have contributed to a
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growing societal awareness of our “connectedness” to, and an openmindedness towards, all

2

people, all countries, and all cultures in the world.

3

Second, some assert that our society has witnessed the decline of a philosophy focused on

4

individual rights, logic, and reason and the concomitant rise of a counterbalancing ethos, focused

5

on compassion, care, relationships, and connectedness.107 Perhaps our societal values have

6

begun to shift and change as a result of growing diversity in our power structure, governments,

7

corporations, schools, and other institutions. The ethics and values of previously disempowered

8

individuals may have begun to seep into our collective consciousness.108 The increasing

9

influence of a “feminine ethic” or “ethic of care” may have led to a greater emphasis on

10

interpersonal relationships, emotional wellbeing, and interpersonal harmony.109

11

For example, in 1988, Anne Wilson Schaef and Diane Fassel argued that our entire

12

society is undergoing a paradigm shift, from the predominance of what they call the “White Male

13

System/Reactive Female System,” which values logic, rationality, objectivity, superiority,

14

individuality, detachment, and correctness, to the rise of an alternative system, the “Emerging

15

Female System.”110 They described this paradigm shift as a move from a closed, static, objective

16

worldview to one valuing wholeness, reconciliation, vulnerability, holism, health, cooperation,

17

ecology, spirituality, and transformation. They describe it as a shift from positivism, empiricism,
106

This particular shift, however, appears to have reversed as a result of the events of September 11, 2001.
ANNE WILSON SCHAEF, WHEN SOCIETY BECOMES AN ADDICT 5-18 (1987) (controversially describing the rightsbased philosophy as the “White Male System;” noting that it is the same as the Addictive System, using the
addictions model of human behavior); ANNE WILSON SCHAEF & DIANE FASSEL, THE ADDICTIVE ORGANIZATION 3346 (1988) (tracking this paradigm shift through the work of (among many others) Thomas Kuhn in 1970, Marilyn
Ferguson in 1980, Morris Berman in 1984, and Carol Gilligan in 1979).
108
See AMY HILSMAN KASTLEY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW (Carolina Academic Press 2000).
109
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Review Essay, What’s Gender Got to Do With It?: The Politics and Morality of an
Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265 (1996).
110
Schaef and Fassel, supra note 91.
107
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and the certainty of right answers to the uncertainty of the unknown.111 They track this paradigm

2

shift from science to business, education, religion, and medicine and note the contribution of

3

feminist thought and alternative perspectives to the shift.112

4

B.

5

Post-Enlightenment Values
Law professor Thomas Barton brilliantly puts this philosophical shift in historical

6

perspective when he identifies that our society is moving into a “Post-Enlightenment” phase,

7

complete with a new set of values. He explains that the current American legal system has

8

idealized Enlightenment values such as personal freedom, independence, autonomy, will, and

9

individual liberty for years, but these values are now giving way to a Post-Enlightenment period,

10

in which “the concepts of separation -- both intellectual and social – are eroding in favor of the

11

long-subordinated notions of [human] connection.”113 Professor Barton points to an “emerging

12

culture of connectedness” as evidence of the rise of Post-Enlightenment values such as

13

belongingness, loyalty, community, cultural identity, and people’s relationships to each other and

14

to their communities. For example, Professor Barton notes a growing concern in the law for

15

issues of inequality of power in human relationships (e.g., domestic violence law) and stronger

16

recognition and protection of one’s cultural identity or membership in a particular ethnic group

17

(e.g., Native American law, recognition of specific cultural beliefs as exonerating or mitigating
111

ANNE WILSON SCHAEF, WHEN SOCIETY BECOMES AN ADDICT 8-9 (1987) (quoting Morris Berman’s insight that
this shift is towards “participatory consciousness”).
112
Id.
113
Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47 EMORY L. J. 163,
163-64 (1998). Barton explains that Enlightenment values are associated with the Enlightenment period, which has
predominated for the past 300 or so years, and with 18th century writers such as Voltaire, Kant, Montesquieu, and
Bentham. Interestingly, the period before the Enlightenment is typically thought of as the Renaissance, which is
associated with humanism and humanistic values (the pendulum swings, yet again!). And, interestingly, a group of
lawyers associated with one of the vectors of the comprehensive law movement, holistic justice, has formed a
lawyer group, website, and support mechanism named Renaissance Lawyer (http://www.renaissancelawyer.com)
(visited April 14, 2005).
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factors, and legal respect for cultural differences). These developments evidence the growth of

2

Post-Enlightenment values.

3

Professor Barton goes on to argue that law based on Enlightenment values functions well

4

when a decision as to right or wrong, black or white, must be made. However, it is ineffective in

5

other situations, because it does not easily accommodate or honor the fact that the parties may

6

have an ongoing relationship with each other or with their communities. Professor Barton says:

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

...in a given case the law may oscillate between either separationist functions or
connectedness values. This is because the desired outcomes often involve both
protection and the building of a stronger relationship. In many instances of domestic
violence, for example, the victim certainly wants and needs protection. The victim,
however, may not want or may not be able to afford for the underlying relationship to be
terminated. Instead, the victim desires the underlying relationship to be made more
healthy and respectful. Yet this is precisely the sort of solution for which the
Enlightenment legal process is poorly equipped.... Cases involving communities which
are hostile to racial, ethnic, or sexual orientation minorities, cases involving unruly
children, and even cases involving noisy neighbors may present the same challenges--to
build stronger relationships among the parties while simultaneously stopping whatever
immediately threatening behaviors escalated the problem to the legal domain. The
fundamental need is for an integrative solution that works with, rather than ignores, the
given social context.114

22

Perhaps in response to the shortcomings of Enlightenment law, various alternative ways

23

of handling legal problems have developed, such as creative problem solving, transformative

24

mediation, victim-offender mediation in criminal law, community-based sentencing of criminals,

25

teen court, and collaborative approaches to divorce and child custody matters. All of these

26

approaches, which are part of the comprehensive law movement, explicitly honor people's

27

relationships with each other instead of focusing solely on individual rights. Because they seek

28

to maintain and preserve those connected relationships instead of sacrificing or destroying them

29

in the name of individuality and separateness, they are consistent with Professor Barton’s Post-

30

Enlightenment values.
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C.

2

Jurisprudential Propellers
For years, legal realism was the predominant jurisprudential school of thought in the

3

United States. The pessimism of legal realism and its critical legal studies offspring may have

4

created a longing for solutions and hope. The certainty of realism’s predecessors, natural law

5

and legal positivism, probably fostered a reassuring sense of order, predictability, and rationality

6

in the law, but this predictability disintegrated in the last 40 or 50 years. Cynicism and

7

discouragement may have grown, when legal realism emerged in the 1930s to debunk the neat

8

universe of legal positivism and point out that law, as made by legislators and judges, was much

9

more capricious and biased than positivism made it appear. Realism may have helped us lose

10

faith in the justice meted out by the legal system.115

11

After realism, jurisprudential thought Balkanized116 into various movements that

12

understand law from the lens of a particular viewpoint, including critical legal studies, feminist

13

theory, and the “law and” movements.117 Most of these newer schools of thought expand upon

14

the basic concept of legal realism by viewing law as a product of deep and pervasive societal

15

biases.

16

All of these schools of thought, however, leave us with a terrific explication of a problem

17

but without a solution. If law is indeed arbitrary and capricious, what then? What approach does
114

Id. at 214-15.
David M. Hunsaker, Law, Humanism and Communication: Suggestions for Limited Curricular Reform, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 417, 419 (1979-80) (describing the relationship between legal realism, legal positivism, and
Langdell’s case method approach to legal education). Originally, natural law predominated, with its idea that laws
were simply reflections of preexisting, divine laws that existed independent of man. Then, legal positivism
emerged, with its idea that laws were simply black and white rules that conformed to rules of logic and analysis; if
one could find the proper rule or exception, and precedent, one could generate the proper rule of law to fit any
particular legal problem. Cases were viewed as “the embodiment of legal principles.” Id. In contrast, realism
suggested that judges and juries decided legal cases based on their moods, their biases, their predilections, and a
million other unspoken criteria. Cases were viewed as “in fact the rationalizations for values choices made by
judges.”
116
I am indebted to Professor Ellen Waldman of Thomas Jefferson School of Law for this outline of the
development of the newer jurisprudential schools of thought and for the term, “Balkanized.”
117
See e.g., law and economics, law and literature, law and psychology, law and sociology, law and socioeconomics.
115
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one then take to practicing law, judging cases, or making law? Further, once we accept that law

2

and our legal system are not necessarily rational or logical, the question becomes “why use it at

3

all?” In fact, some sectors of American society have abandoned formal legal courts, either

4

resorting to self-help methods, private judges, mediation, or private courts to settle their legal

5

problems. Therapeutic jurisprudence in particular and the comprehensive law movement in

6

general may have developed in response to the lack of hope and direction we are left with, once

7

we accept the major premise of legal realism and these newer schools of thought. The idea of

8

recognizing law’s potential to have a positive impact on people’s lives and of creating alternative

9

means of resolving legal problems may provide hope during a time when the reliability, utility,

10

or rationality of law and legal procedures are in question.

11

Viewing law as a healing profession is a natural outgrowth of feminist jurisprudence.

12

Focusing on the healing, restorative, curative functions of law is entirely consistent with

13

feminine and feminist values,118 which have mainstreamed into current legal thought through

14

feminist jurisprudence. The comprehensive law movement is also a natural product of the law

15

and psychology movement, which looks at law, lawyering, and legal processes from a

16

psychological perspective. Once one begins to examine the psychological aspects of law, or

17

even the psychological aspects of legal problems or clients, the therapeutic potential of law and

18

legal processes becomes apparent. It is natural, then, to propose ways to maximize this potential

19

and minimize any detrimental psychological effects. This is precisely what one of the most

20

vibrant vectors of the movement, therapeutic jurisprudence, seeks to do.
118

For example, a more “feminine” approach to establishing criminal culpability for someone who is mentally
disordered is taken by Lady Wooton, as quoted in RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
589-91 (3d ed. 1999). There, she argues for bifurcating guilt and sentencing and then explains that the distinction
between hospitalization and incarceration becomes unnecessary. Her idea is that the offender simply serves a
custodial sentence, with the line between prisons and mental health treatment being blurred. Barbara Wooton, Book
Review of A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense, 77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1028-32 (1968), quoted by Reisner et al., supra, at
589-91.
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Since at least 1980, commentators within the legal profession have bemoaned the state of

2

the profession. Commentary on our lack of professionalism, rampant immorality, malfeasance,

3

malpractice, client neglect, overly aggressive natures, greed, and unethical behavior, as well as

4

the lack of attorney discipline and oversight, has been prolific.119 Individuals inside and outside

5

the legal profession alike have been dissatisfied with the law, the American legal system, and

6

lawyers. The situation has been described as a professionalism crisis. Society’s opinion of

7

lawyers is depressingly low. The public sees lawyers as makers of conflict and dissension rather

8

than as positive forces in people’s lives or work. Alcoholism, depression, and other

9

psychological problems exist in the legal profession at least twice as frequently as they appear in

10

the general population. These problems comprise a “tripartite crisis” in the legal profession,

11

consisting of deprofessionalism, low public opinion of lawyers, and lawyer distress and

12

dissatisfaction.120

13

In response to this tripartite crisis, many well-seasoned practicing lawyers have sought

14

alternative forms of law practice, often saying something like, “If I can’t find another way to

15

practice law, one that I find satisfying and fulfilling, then I am quitting law entirely.” The search

16

for alternatives has led many practicing lawyers to develop the forms of practice that comprise

17

the comprehensive law movement. Many of the vectors emerged because of lawyers’, clients’,

18

and society’s deep dissatisfaction with existing models for handling legal matters.

19

Academic commentators have responded to this tripartite crisis by proposing solutions

20

such as more pro bono and public service, returning to the roots of our profession as counselors

21

and advisors, viewing law as a “calling” rather than as a business, and taking different
119

Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney attributes Beaming on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U.L.REV. 1337 (1997) [hereinafter Daicoff, Review].
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approaches to lawyering, such as lawyering with an “ethic of care”121 and “moral lawyering.”122

2

Despite the lack of an explicit link between these proposals and the emergence of the vectors of

3

the comprehensive law movement, it is clear that the approaches embodied in the comprehensive

4

law movement are consistent with the call of these commentators for value-laden approaches. 123

5

D.

6

Parallel Developments in Psychology
In addition, the comprehensive law movement may reflect a parallel progression within

7

social science and science in general, from a more analytical, scientific approach to a more

8

humanistic, relativistic, and individualized approach. In social science, for example, psychology

9

has undergone several phases, beginning with the analytic approach of Sigmund Freud and Carl

10

Jung and psychodynamic theory. It then progressed from this past-oriented and sometimes

11

elusive approach to a more scientific, logical, tangible, almost mechanical approach, in B. F.

12

Skinner’s behaviorism. Then, in response perhaps to the black-and-whiteness of behaviorism,

13

Carl Rogers’ humanistic psychology emerged, with its focus on optimizing human potential, on

14

client-centered, individualized treatment, and on the interpersonal relationships involved in

15

therapy.

16

Similarly, law was first seen as a somewhat undisciplined liberal “art,” until Christopher

17

Langdell of Harvard proposed a more “scientific” approach to law through the study of cases.

18

Since then, law has been viewed as something that can be studied via a rational, logical
120

Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards To Change Their Spots: Can Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to
Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998); DAICOFF,
KNOW THYSELF, supra note 1.
121
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93.
122
Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97,
97-99 (1985).
123
See Marc W. Patry, David B. Wexler, Dennis P. Stolle, & Alan J. Tomkins, Better Legal Counseling Through
Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439, 441 (1998)
(suggesting a strong possibility for therapeutic jurisprudence to incorporate an ethic of care in preventive law).

50

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

approach. Now, like psychology, law may be moving into a more humanistic mode, focused

2

more on human wellbeing and interpersonal relationships.

3

E.

4

Humanism and Law in the 1970’s; Neo-Humanism in the 2000’s
Finally, the comprehensive law movement may reflect a resurgence of a humanistic

5

movement in law that occurred in the 1960’s and 1970’s. This earlier humanism-in-law effort

6

may have gone “underground” during the materialistic and prosperous 1980’s, but be resurfacing

7

today in a sort of “neo-humanism” evidenced by the popularity of the vectors of the

8

comprehensive law movement.

9
10

In 1980, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for lawyers to return to their roles as healers,
foreshadowing the comprehensive law movement by a decade or more. He said:

11
12
13
14
15
16

[Lawyers] must be legal architects, engineers, builders, and from time to time, inventors
as well. We have served, and must continue to see our role, as problem-solvers,
harmonizers, and peacemakers, the healers – not the promoters – of conflict.124
As early as 1955, Dean Griswold argued for “the inclusion of human relations and
communications training in the law school curriculum.”125 He pointed out that:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

[L]awyers deal with people. They deal with people far more than they do with appellate
courts. They deal with clients; they deal with witnesses; they deal with persons against
whom demands are made; they carry on negotiations; they are constantly endeavoring to
come to agreements of one sort or another with people, to persuade people, sometimes
when they are reluctant to be persuaded. Lawyers are constantly dealing with people
who are under stress or strain of one sort or another. 126
Robert Redmount in 1968 charged that legal education emphasized “a cohering
framework and system of rules and reason … in which the data of experience are
124

Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) citing Warren E. Burger, The
Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377,
378 (1980).
125
Hunsaker, supra note 98, at 421 citing Dean Griswold, 37 CHICAGO B. RECORD 199, 203 (1956), cited in Howard
Sacks, Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317 (1959).
126
Hunsaker, supra note 98, at 421 citing Dean Griswold, 37 CHICAGO B. RECORD 199, 203 (1956), cited in Howard
Sacks, Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317 (1959).
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subordinate.”127 He argued for explicitly using psychology in law school to teach law students

2

greater psychological sophistication and asserted that “continuing social change and the lack of

3

good attunement to personal and social experience jeopardize law’s standing and competence to

4

deal effectively with social and personal problems.”128

5

Shaffer and Redmount in 1975 condemned legal education for lacking “mental, moral,

6

emotional, and social development and therefore … not serv[ing]… the best interests of society,

7

or for that matter, the best interests of the legal profession. It lacks humanistic concern…”129

8

Hunsaker in 1979 agreed and said: “[w]hile the law school may develop skills in analysis, issue

9

spotting, fact-principle discrimination, and logical deduction, it has neglected and ignored the

10

teaching of humanistic values and the development of human relations skills [emphasis in

11

original].”130 These authors went on to advocate additional communication skills training,

12

human relations training, and infusion of social science knowledge in legal education.131

13

These pleas were echoed in a 1978 book by clinical psychiatrist Andrew Watson. In this

14

book, Watson integrated law and psychology and advocated a psychological approach to legal

15

counseling.132 A number of articles and commentary followed from 1965 to 1980, proposing a

16

greater emphasis in the law on psychological knowledge, human experience, interpersonal skills,

17

and humanistic values.133 These efforts culminated in a 1981 book by lawyers and law
127

Robert S. Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, 1 CONN. L. REV. 201, 210 (1968) (emphasizing
the value of human experience in law, which is pragmatic to the individual) [Redmount I].
128
Id. at 211.
129
Hunsaker, supra note 98, at 419-20, quoting THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW
STUDENTS AND PEOPLE, chapter 2 at 24 (1977).
130
Hunsaker, supra note 98, at 419.
131
See generally Charles A. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L. J. 1402 (1965) (advocating for
greater emphasis on social science, interdisciplinary approaches, and moral and psychological knowledge in legal
education); Hunsaker, supra note 98, and Redmount I, supra note 110 (all arguing for curricular reform in law
school).
132
ANDREW S. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING PROCESS (Bobbs-Merrill 1975).
133
See ) Peter D’Errico, Stephen Arons, & Janet Rifkin, Humanistic Legal Studies at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18 (1976-77)(predicting a sustained national interest in humanist
analysis in the law in spite of pressure for formal legal techniques); Robert S. Redmount, Humanistic Law Through
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professors Dvorkin, Himmelstein, and Lesnick titled “Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic

2

Perspective on Legal Education and Professionalism.”134

3

Most of this early humanism-in-law commentary noted that law and legal education

4

focused almost exclusively on logical, rational analysis of cases and legal problems. Perhaps

5

this was originally appropriate, as Charles Reich in 1965 noted that, before the 1960s, lawyers

6

usually concerned themselves chiefly what law dealt with: commerce and business. However, he

7

argued that the role of law in society in the 1960s began to change, as law became a “primary

8

instrument … for fundamental social change.”135 Law began to permeate every activity. Social

9

problems, such as poverty, civil unrest, unemployment, and mental illness, increasingly became

10

legal problems. As law became more and more intertwined with social and human problems,

11

Reich says, law had to look to social science for assistance and become “the queen of the

12

humanities.”136 Lawyers and legal education needed to focus on developing interpersonal skills,

13

psychological sophistication, and a more humanistic orientation.137

14

However, the ideas espoused in this earlier psychology in law movement did not entirely

15

become mainstream in legal education, nor did they appear in law practice. What did occur was

16

a greater emphasis on clinical training and clinical programs, including lawyering skills training,

17

in law school. Interviewing, counseling and negotiating courses and clinical opportunities are

18

now available and encouraged in practically every American law school. Thus, this earlier
Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REV. 98 (1969-70) [Redmount II]; Redmount I, supra note 110; Reich, supra note
114; and Hunsaker, supra note 98 (proposing greater emphasis on interpersonal skills, communications skills, and
people skills training in legal education). Other individuals associated with this earlier humanism and law
movement include Paul Brest (now dean of Stanford Law School), Columbia University law professor Peter Straus,
Charlie Halpert (former dean at CUNY-Queens), Professor Howard Lesnick, and Jack Himmelstein.
134
ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMELSTEIN, & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981). This book was in fact specifically influenced
by Carl Rogers’ work on humanistic psychology, thus strengthening the link between various movements in
psychology and law. For a critique of this book, see Walter Gellhorn, “Humanistic Perspective:” A Critique, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 99 (1982).
135
Reich, supra note 114, at 1407.
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humanistic movement did have an effect. However, the hoped-for wholesale infusion of

2

psychology into legal training and law practice did not occur.

3

However, the integration of law and psychology, or humanism and law, may have

4

emerged in the 1990s in the vectors of the comprehensive law movement. The approaches to

5

law and lawyering embodied by the various vectors of the comprehensive law movement are

6

consistent with the humanistic approach advocated in the 1981 book, “Becoming A Lawyer,”138

7

yet they did not develop as a direct result of this early humanistic movement. Instead, they

8

developed mostly from the practicing bar and from a different law and psychology movement

9

known as therapeutic jurisprudence. If these earlier law professors’ efforts to bring humanistic

10

psychology into law have had an effect, the effect appears to have been indirect: skipping over

11

legal education, skipping over a few decades, and emerging now from the “trenches.”

12

Dean emeritus Edward Dauer, who is one of the leaders of preventive law, suggests that

13

perhaps the idealism of this earlier humanism-in-the-law movement crumbled under the strain of

14

the Vietnam War and Watergate, two events that fostered massive cynicism towards law and

15

lawyers.139 The cynicism and disappointment felt by society after these two events may have

16

quashed burgeoning idealism in the 1960s and 1970s and then paved the way for the materialism

17

and self-centeredness found in the profession (and society) in the 1980s. If so, the

18

comprehensive law movement may reflect a concrete response to growing societal

19

disillusionment with the materialism and cynicism of the 1980s.
136

Id. at 1408.
Hunsaker, supra note 98, at 420.
138
ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMELSTEIN, & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
139
Personal communication (e-mail) with Edward Dauer, Dean Emeritus at Denver University College of Law,
August 5, 2002.
137
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In short, a number of philosophical shifts in the last century and particularly in the last

2

decade have paved the way for the comprehensive law movement in the 21st century. Perhaps

3

we have become sated with our own thirst for individual freedom, with our promotion of

4

personal good at the expense of others, and with our worship of individual rights. Maximizing

5

our legal rights and our clients’ has not brought us emotional wellbeing, harmony, peace, joy, or

6

even happiness. Many litigation-experienced clients and lawyers are searching, saying, “there

7

must be a better way” to resolve legal disputes, to handle legal matters, and to practice law.

8

Focusing on the human element in law and on how law can serve as a positive force in the lives

9

of individuals, families, groups, and communities could be a natural product of this discomfort

10

with and within the law -- and of shifts in attitude occurring within and without the legal

11

profession.

12
13

V. TEACHING COMPREHENSIVE LAW APPROACHES
As the comprehensive law movement develops, other questions and concerns have

14

emerged. First, there are a number of contemporary movements in legal education, such as

15

efforts to humanize legal education, mindfulness meditation, and the infusion of spirituality into

16

law school, that may be related to the movement. Second, there may be additional skills that

17

attorneys and law students will require in order to successfully practice comprehensive law.

18

Finally, the relationship of the comprehensive law movement to the psychology of lawyers

19

should be explored. This section will explore each of these concerns, in turn.

20

A. Parallel Developments in Legal Education

21

While many of the vectors of the comprehensive law movement have been developed by

22

practicing lawyers and judges, some parallel developments have emerged in legal education,

23

primarily through the work of various like-minded law professors. These academic
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developments are related to the comprehensive law movement because of their emphasis on

2

humanism, values, and enhanced interpersonal and intrapersonal sensitivity. They also assist law

3

students to develop or preserve core skills and attributes necessary to effectively practice law

4

comprehensively.

5

1. The Humanizing Legal Education Movement

6

Energized by the leadership and enthusiasm of law professor Lawrence Krieger,140 a group of

7

law professors have banded together to make law school and legal education a more humane

8

environment. Aware of common complaints about the competitive and intimidating nature of the

9

law school environment141 and painfully aware of the empirical data demonstrating that law

10

students are “normal” before they enter law school but rapidly develop depression and other

11

psychiatric distress thereafter, which does not abate after graduation,142 these professors began

12

sharing information, teaching techniques, and research on how to humanize legal education.143

13

While the thrust of this movement has focused on humanizing the experience of law school for

14

law students, its values are consistent with comprehensive law’s intention of humanizing legal

15

process for participants. The humanizing movement also encourages law students to identify,

16

evaluate, and maintain their own personal morals, values, beliefs, and standards during law

17

school. This exploration of values may prepare or propel some students to practice law
140

Clinical law professor at Florida State University Law School.
Lawrence S. Krieger, Psychological Insights: Why Our Students and Graduates Suffer, And What We Might Do
About It, 1 J. ASS’N LEG. WRITING DIRECTORS 259, 262 (2002).
142
Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological
Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2 (1996).
143
Their first formal program was presented at the 2001 annual Association of American Law Schools conference.
Currently this group’s listserve has 250 subscribers. Humanizing Legal Education, at the annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools jointly sponsored by the Sections on Clinical Legal Education, Law, &
Mental Disability, and Law & Religion, in San Francisco, CA, January 2001; at
www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/humanizing_lawschool.php (quoting website, “Humanizing legal education is
an initiative shared by legal educators seeking to maximize the overall health, well being, and career satisfaction of
141
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comprehensively rather than traditionally.

2

2. Mindfulness Meditation

3

Law professor Leonard Riskin, author and legal commentator Steven Keeva, and others have

4

written about the importance of the lawyer’s mental state to the efficacy of his or her work.144

5

One strategy that many attorneys and law students are experimenting with, to improve their

6

professional efficacy, is “mindfulness meditation.” Some have incorporated the principles and

7

insights of mindfulness meditation into their preparation for professional practice. These

8

concepts have been introduced to law students through such avenues as the Yale Law School

9

project for Meditation and the Law and programs sponsored by the Fetzer Institute.145 Being

10

more aware of and able to manage and monitor one’s mental state, emotions, and reactions can

11

assist lawyers in their daily work, particularly if they are practicing comprehensive law, due to

12

its emphasis on the ability to identify and cope with the emotions and mental states of others.

13

3. Law and Spirituality

14

Law and religion is a familiar topic, but some recent commentary has focused on the concept

15

that one’s spiritual beliefs, values, and practices are relevant to law, legal education, and law

16

practice.146 Specifically, they are important for preparing one’s mental state for legal work,
law students and lawyers.”); listserve at www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/humanizing_lawschool/listserve.php
(sites visited on April 11, 2005).
144
Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Mediation to Law
Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002); Douglas A. Codiga, Reflection on the
Potential Growth of Mindfulness Mediation in the Law, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002); see also STEVEN
KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES, FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE (Contemporary Books
1999).
145
See Steven W. Keeva, Practicing From the Inside Out, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2002); Codiga, supra note
122.
146
See Calvin G. C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in Law School Clinic, 35
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); Charles Senger, Spirituality in Law School, 81 MICH. B.J. 44 (Dec. 2002).
Professor Calvin Pang, who infuses spirituality into his law school clinical courses, has written at length about how
to incorporate spirituality into a clinical course and the benefits of doing so. Calvin G. C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle:
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maintaining the lawyer’s mental health, the professional choices one makes as a lawyer, and the

2

way in which one interacts with clients. Lawyers who have personal spiritual practices or who

3

are explicitly faith-based themselves may be drawn to comprehensive law practice, due to the

4

easy interface of the goals of comprehensive law with their personal values.

5

B. Teaching Comprehensive Law Practice Skills

6

Mindfulness meditation and personal spiritual practices may be skills helpful to the

7

comprehensive practice of law. In addition to these, there are a number of other skills that

8

lawyers may need in order to practice law comprehensively. This section outlines and describes

9

these skills.

10

Law professor Leonard Riskin provides a terrific football analogy to understand the

11

relevance of these skills to the comprehensive law movement. He reminds us that a football

12

coach teaches his players the overall philosophy of football as well as how to throw, block, and

13

tackle. The players learn the game and then practice the moves on the field. However, if the

14

players do not actually go to the gym and become stronger through weight lifting, they do not

15

become strong, effective football players. Just as strength training prepares football players to

16

play football, the comprehensive law skills, outlined below, prepare comprehensive lawyers to
Finding a Place for Spirituality in Law School Clinic, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); and 20 R. HAW.L.REV.
1; 1995-JUN HAW. B.J. 28; 1993-SEP HAW. B.J. 24. Professor Charles Senger teaches a law school course devoted
entirely to law and spirituality; he presented a talk on his course at the second international conference on
therapeutic jurisprudence, May 2001, in Cincinnati, Ohio. In that panel on law and spirituality, Professor Pang of
the University of Hawaii Law School spoke, as well as Professor Daisy Floyd of Texas Tech. Professor Tim Floyd
of Texas Tech noted the importance of concepts such as forgiveness, prayer, and priority-setting to lawyers seeking
to incorporate their spiritual values into their law practices.146 According to Professor Floyd, small groups of
practicing lawyers discussing law and spirituality have sprung up around the country. Talk given by Professor Tim
Floyd of Texas Tech University School of Law, April 7, 2003, at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center,
Huntington, New York, at the symposium titled: “Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning in the
Practice of Law” [hereinafter “Discontents”]. Practicing lawyer Arnie Herz has, on occasion, introduced a client to
nonreligious, nondenominational spiritual practices because he thought it would improve the client’s mental state
and assist the client in visualizing a positive future for himself of herself after the legal dispute’s resolution. Talk
given by Arnie Herz at Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida, on October 22, 2003.
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perform their work.147 These skills include: excellent interpersonal, human relations skills; self-

2

knowledge (or intrapersonal skills); and rudimentary psychological sophistication, or emotional

3

intelligence.148

4

1. Interpersonal Skills

5

First, there are communications and relational skills that attorneys need in order to form

6

and maintain working relationships with their clients, opponents, judges, and other legal

7

personnel. These skills include empathy, advanced empathy, reflective listening, and

8

questioning skills. Empathy is often defined as the ability to stand in another’s shoes and

9

express an understanding of the other’s thoughts and feelings. Advanced empathy refers to the

10

ability to express the implicit thoughts and feelings under the surface of the other’s actions and

11

words. For example, a person facing major surgery might express anger, frustration, and

12

irritation with the doctors but underneath might feel afraid, worried, and mistrustful of the

13

surgeons. Basic empathy would reflect the person’s anger; advanced empathy would recognize

14

and acknowledge the underlying fear. Advanced empathy always runs the risk of being

15

inaccurate, as the hearer must guess at the implicit or submerged feelings of the other. Reflective

16

listening, or active listening, refers to the ability to hear and paraphrase the facts of the other’s

17

words as well as the thoughts and feelings expressed by the other. It usually employs

18

paraphrasing of the events as well as basic empathy (in the form of restatements of the explicit

19

feelings expressed); it tends to result in the other feeling “heard” and understood. Questioning

20

skills refer to the ability to distinguish between closed-ended questions (those requiring only a
147

Personal communication with University of Missouri-Columbia law professor Leonard L. Riskin, April 6, 2003,
at “Discontents,” supra note 131.
148
Marjorie A Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL
L. REV. 259 (1999) (providing an excellent and exhaustive review of the skills needed to practice law
comprehensively); see also Kerper, supra note 2, at 371-72 (noting the importance of the theories of multiple
intelligences to learning to creatively problem solve as a lawyer).
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yes or no answer) and open-ended questions (those requiring an answer other than yes or no) and

2

the ability to know when to use each type. Closed ended questions tend to focus and direct the

3

speaker, often closing down the flow of information; open-ended questions, particularly when

4

combined with basic empathy, tend to encourage the flow of information and elicit more from

5

the speaker. These basic communications skills are useful in creating trusting relationships with

6

clients, witnesses, and other lawyers or when negotiating with other parties or lawyers.

7

Second, to practice law comprehensively, attorneys need a minimal amount of

8

psychological sophistication and an ability to contain and help clients maintain their emotions.

9

They also need to know when they are in over their heads. When it is appropriate to refer a

10

client to professional therapy or counseling, the lawyer should be prepared to make the referral

11

and perhaps offer to personally make the call to a suitable professional (and let the client know

12

that the professional is expecting his or her call). Therapeutically-oriented lawyers might view

13

these situations as a psycholegal soft spot that needs to be properly addressed by the referral to

14

professional psychological help. A second, conflicting psycholegal soft spot may then arise if

15

the referral to therapy in some way prejudices the client’s legal case, for example, by raising

16

doubt as to the client’s mental state.

17

One skill that lawyers particularly need is the ability to recognize and deal with

18

individuals going through the grief process.149 Every litigant engaging an attorney has suffered a

19

loss of some sort. Thus, each litigant is likely to be experiencing one or more of Elizabeth

20

Kubler-Ross’ famous five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and
149

Clinical psychologist Sanford Portnoy claims that over 40% of attorney-client communications involve the
clients’ emotions and yet attorneys routinely dismiss the need to address clients’ emotions. For example, he says
there are more complaints against attorneys brought by divorce clients and personal injury clients, probably because
those clients’ emotions generally run high and they may displace anger onto the attorneys. Talk given by Dr.
Portnoy at Touro College Law Center, April 7, 2003, “Discontents,” supra note 131. Dr. Portnoy published these
ideas in his book, SANFORD M. PORTNOY, THE FAMILY LAWYER’S GUIDE TO BUILDING SUCCESSFUL
RELATIONSHIPS (2000).
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acceptance.150 Litigation can facilitate or suspend the grief process – the process of dealing with

2

and resolving the loss that resulted in the legal problem. For example, in wrongful death actions,

3

litigation can interrupt the process of grieving if it focuses too long on the cause of or

4

responsibility for the death. On the other hand, litigation facilitates the grief process when it

5

helps the survivors sort out the events leading to the death or fulfills their sense of duty to the

6

deceased person, and is begun and concluded quickly after the death.151

7

Lawyers working with traumatized clients can help reverse the effects of trauma, using

8

excellent interpersonal skills. For example, if the client was raped and experienced degradation

9

and humiliation, the lawyer can provide the client with an additional measure of respect,

10

autonomy, and control. The attorney can ask the client when and for how long she wants to talk

11

about the event, listen well, and treat her with respect.152 Therapeutically-oriented lawyers might

12

well view this as a psycholegal soft spot that the lawyer can address with these restorative,

13

relational measures.153

14

2. Intrapersonal Skills

15

In addition to the above human relations skills, lawyers also need intrapersonal skills,

16

meaning the ability to know themselves well enough to determine when they are over- or under-

17

reacting to a particular client, cause, or party. This is sometimes referred to as

18

“countertransference,” meaning when the lawyer’s own internal feelings, experiences, biases,

19

fears, frustrations, likes, or dislikes unduly influence or interfere with his or her work and the

20

lawyer loses his or her ability to react neutrally and objectively to the client, cause, or party.
150

ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 34-99 (1969) (discussing the five stages of coping in
terminally ill patients).
151
Wexler & Winick, KEY, supra note 6, at 452-453.
152
Id.
153
Ideas paraphrased from comments by University of Miami law professor Bruce Winick, April 7, 2003,
“Discontents,” supra note 131.
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This can only be detected if the lawyer is adept at knowing himself or herself and his or her

2

strengths and weaknesses, and can effectively evaluate and monitor his or her emotions,

3

thoughts, and actions.
In addition, lawyers need the ability to deal effectively with such countertransference,154

4
5

including the ability to maintain personal boundaries. Lawyers, particularly those who feel

6

compassion and empathy for their clients, can become enmeshed with clients and their emotions.

7

Inappropriate attachment or involvement can cause the lawyer stress, derail the lawyer-client

8

relationship, distort the legal representation, distract the client from seeking professional

9

psychological help, and give rise to ethical dilemmas.155

10

For example, lawyers working with clients who were sexually assaulted or abused, or clients

11

fighting human rights violations, can be vicariously traumatized by this exposure.156

12

Comprehensive lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to this secondary trauma, because they

13

are likely to respond to these clients with understanding and empathy. Coping strategies

14

therefore need to go beyond simple stress management; lawyers need the ability to identify,

15

manage, and contain their own distressing emotions.157

16

C. Implications of the Movement for Law Student and Lawyer Distress

17

Lawyers experience alcoholism, depression, and other forms of psychological distress and

18

dissatisfaction at a rate of about 20%, or one in five, which is about twice the levels found in the
154

Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate & Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L.
REV. 259, 261-66 (1999).
155
Ideas paraphrased from talk given by Yale University law professor Jean Koh Peters, April 7, 2003,
“Discontents,” supra note 131; see also Marjorie A. Silver et al., Stress, Burnout, Vicarious Trauma, and Other
Emotional Realities in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 19 TOURO L. REV. 847 (2004) (detailing a panel discussion
that broadly looked at the emotional competence and intelligence of lawyers and the possibilities for positive
intervention in legal education).
156
Id.
157
See Riskin and Codiga, both supra note 126, and Keeva, supra note 127.

62

Revolution – Daicoff – Draft dated 11-8-04

1

general population.158 Reasons for this unduly high level of psychological distress within the

2

legal profession are unclear. Most commentators have pointed to the long hours, the pressures of

3

private practice, competition in the profession, and deprofessionalism. However, until 2001, the

4

empirical research linked lawyer distress not to these factors, but instead only to feelings of

5

hostility, marital distress, job dissatisfaction, and a lack of social support.159

6

In 2001, in a groundbreaking empirical study, Lawrence Krieger and Kannon Sheldon

7

discovered that law student (and, presumably, lawyer) distress is associated with certain shifts in

8

one’s value system during law school. Specifically, law students were more likely to be

9

distressed as they became progressively less oriented toward personal “growth/self acceptance,

10

intimacy/emotional connection and community/societal contribution.” Distress was also

11

increased as students became less likely to act for interest or inherent satisfaction and “more

12

oriented toward appearance/attractiveness” and “money/luxuries, popularity/fame” as well as

13

more motivated to please others.160 Thus, as law students focused less on intrinsic satisfactions

14

and more on extrinsic rewards, they were more likely to experience a decline in their emotional

15

wellbeing.161 This suggests that lawyers who focus on external rewards such as money, prestige,

16

Martindale-Hubbell ratings, and even win-loss records, may be at risk for developing distress.

17

The vectors of the comprehensive law movement explicitly allow lawyers to infuse a set of

18

values into their law practice that may provide intrinsic rewards. For example, the

19

therapeutically-oriented lawyer may feel inherent satisfaction from legal work if he or she values

20

“doing good” for others and defines “good” as enhancing others’ psychological wellbeing. The
158

DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF, supra note 1.
Beck & Sales, supra note 124.
160
Lawrence S. Krieger & Kannon M. Sheldon, Does Law School Change Law Students? Values, Motives, and
Well-being in a First Year Class (unpublished manuscript, 2001) (studying the emotional wellbeing of Florida State
University law students and comparing it to that of advanced undergraduate students at the University of Missouri).
161
Id. This values shift and decline in wellbeing occurred as early as the first year of law school.
159
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collaborative lawyer may obtain inherent satisfaction from doing work that preserves and fosters

2

harmonious relationships between divorcing spouses, knowing that those relationships will lead

3

to a better life and better mental health for the children of the divorce. Restorative justice

4

practitioners may experience satisfaction in seeing victims of crime achieve “closure,”

5

reconciliation, and come to terms with the crime and its effects, in seeing victims and offenders

6

receive apology and forgiveness, respectively, and in seeing offenders experience “therapeutic

7

shame” that effectively motivates them not to recidivate. Preventive lawyers may experience

8

satisfaction in knowing their legal efforts helped avoid the economic and temporal waste of a

9

lawsuit. Lawyers and judges employing the wisdom of procedural justice may appreciate the

10

enhanced satisfaction their clients and litigants gain from a legal process that allows for voice

11

and participation. Lawyers, judges, and other legal personnel involved in drug treatment courts

12

have reported personal satisfaction from the success of the court’s graduates in staying free from

13

drugs and crime.162

14

Empirical research indicates that individuals who prefer the “Feeling” mode of decision-

15

making as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator163 are in the minority in the legal

16

profession,164 tend to drop out of law school,165 and may be more prone to experience job
162

See Chase & Hora, supra note 99.
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a counseling instrument used to categorize individuals into one of 16
“types,” based on their preferences on four continua: Extraversion/Introversion; Sensing/Intuiting;
Thinking/Feeling; and Judging/Perceiving. It was developed by Katharine Briggs and Isabel Myers and is widely
used in corporate and academic settings to help people better understand the preferred approaches to life of
themselves and others. There are approximately four published studies of the Myers-Briggs “types” preferred by
lawyers and law students. See also Vernellia R. Randall, Increasing Retention and Improving Performance:
Practical Advice on Using Cooperative Learning in Law Schools, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV 201 (1999); Eric Y.
Drogin, Jurisprudent Therapy and Competency, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 41 (2004); Lawrence R. Richard,
Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979
(2002); MARY H. MCCAULLEY & FRANK L. NATTER, PSYCHOLOGICAL (MYERS-BRIGGS) TYPE DIFFERENCES IN
EDUCATION (1974).
164
Daicoff, Review, supra note 110, at 1391-92.
165
Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460-67
(1967) (defining "Feeling" type in 1967 study and finding that almost twice as many "Feeling" types dropped out of
law school as compared to "Thinking" types).
163
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dissatisfaction as lawyers.166 Feelers prefer "harmonizing, building relationships, pleasing

2

people, making decisions on the basis of [their own] ... personal likes and dislikes, and being

3

attentive to the personal needs of others" and like to avoid conflict and criticism.167 The opposite

4

of Feeling is Thinking; Thinkers prefer "logical analysis, principles, cool and impersonal

5

reasoning and cost/benefit analyses" and are "more tolerant of conflict and criticism."

6

Psychologist and lawyer Dr. Lawrence Richard, one of the leading researchers on the Myers-

7

Briggs type of lawyers, says that the dimensions of Thinking and Feeling both represent:

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

rational, valid decision-making methods. Both involve thought, and neither process is
related to emotions. ...
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Thinking prefer to come to
closure in a logical, orderly manner. They can readily discern inaccuracies and are often
critical. They can easily hurt others' feelings without knowing it. They are excellent
problem-solvers. They review the cause and effect of potential actions before deciding.
Thinkers are often accused of being cold and somewhat calculating because their
decisions do not reflect their own personal values. They focus on discovering truth, and
they seek justice.
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Feeling apply their own
personal values to make choices. They seek harmony and, therefore, are sensitive to the
effect of their decisions on others. They need, and are adept at giving, praise. They are
interested in the person behind the idea or the job. They seek to do what is right for
themselves and other people and are interested in mercy.168
Feeling-type individuals are very likely to be attracted to comprehensive law approaches,

24

because they encourage the lawyer to focus on interpersonal harmony, do what is right for

25

others, avoid conflict and harm to others, and therapeutic, humanistic, or sanative values into his

26

or her work. These approaches allow a Feeling-oriented lawyer to infuse his or her own personal

27

morals and values into his or her work, assuming that the lawyer values enhanced mental

28

wellbeing and improved interpersonal relationships. For example, restorative justice and
166

Richard, supra note 149, (Thinkers more plentiful in law; Thinking lawyers more satisfied with their jobs than
Feeling lawyers).
167
Id. at 1394.
168
SUSAN J. BELL & LAWRENCE R. RICHARD, ANATOMY OF A LAWYER: PERSONALITY AND LONG-TERM CAREER
SATISFACTION, IN FULL DISCLOSURE: DO YOU REALLY WANT TO BE A LAWYER? 149, 152 (Susan J. Bell ed., 2d ed.
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collaborative law explicitly focus on interpersonal and relational harmony; transformative

2

mediation may indirectly foster it as well. All three tend to avoid interpersonal conflict. Holistic

3

justice explicitly encourages lawyers to follow their own values in determining whether to take a

4

case and what courses of action to take in representing the client. Creative problem solving and

5

therapeutic jurisprudence allow the lawyer to feel as if he or she is “doing good,” to the extent

6

that good is defined as optimizing one’s total life situation or maximizing others’ psychological

7

wellbeing, respectively.

8
9

To the extent that Feeling-oriented lawyers and law students are likely to drop out of law, or
are simply dissatisfied with their work, the comprehensive law approaches offer great promise

10

and hope. They offer an appealing alternative to traditional law practice that does not require the

11

lawyer to leave the profession. Instead, they actually utilize the lawyers’ Feeling preference as

12

an asset to his or her professional life, rather than marginalizing it as a detrimental or neutral

13

feature.

14

CONCLUSION

15

The curative potential of the comprehensive law movement for lawyers, the legal

16

profession, clients, and society is undeniable. Despite this potential, however, there are a

17

number of unanswered questions. For example, the typical adversarial, competitive lawyer

18

personality may impede lawyers’ efforts to practice law more comprehensively. They may resist

19

retooling and change, feel as if they are being asked to practice psychology without the

20

appropriate training and credentials, and worry about committing malpractice. Alternatively,

21

they may worry that comprehensive law practice will increase the standard of care so that if they

22

fail to practice comprehensively they will commit malpractice. Their general preference for the
1992). Richard also notes that the Thinking/Feeling scale is the most significant personality trait for predicting
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Myers-Briggs dimension of Thinking may hamper their efforts to be more empathetic,

2

compassionate, relational, and harm-avoidant. However, research suggests that many lawyers

3

may have had Feeling and care-oriented preferences that were silenced in law school.

4

Comprehensive law approaches may actually encourage some lawyers to rediscover the values

5

and preferences with which they entered law school, rather than asking them to become

6

something they are not. Legal education must, however, retool a bit in order to effectively teach

7

the skills, underlying theories, and approaches contained in the comprehensive law movement.

8

A handful of law schools teach courses on comprehensive law approaches or therapeutic

9

jurisprudence; many law schools are teaching the skills necessary for practicing comprehensive

10
11

law in their clinical courses.169
Another concern is that comprehensive law practice may conflict with the rules of

12

professional responsibility. A close reading of ABA Model Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 2.1 reveals

13

that comprehensive law practice need not violate the ethics code, as long as an open and trusting

14

lawyer-client relationship is formed, clients are given full informed consent, the scope of

15

representation is fully disclosed and agreed upon, and the lawyer’s role as a comprehensive

16

advisor is agreed upon. Model Rule 2.1 explicitly encourages lawyers to include extra-legal

17

factors in their advice to clients, blessing the “rights plus” approach of the comprehensive law

18

vectors. Lawyer must, however, be careful not to oversell comprehensive law approaches to

19

clients simply because the lawyers themselves prefer to practice law this way. They must be

20

sure to present fairly the traditional approaches, alongside the comprehensive law approaches,

21

without bias, and allow the client to decide. Clients must still determine the ultimate goals of
lawyer satisfaction, stating, "those with a preference for Feeling are swimming against the tide." Id. at 153.
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representation. Lawyers and judges must also be careful not to use comprehensive law

2

approaches paternalistically in cases where they feel that the client “really needs” psychological

3

treatment or help but the client simply refuses it, even after full informed consent and candid

4

advice from the lawyer. Lawyers and judges must also, as therapeutic jurisprudence directs, not

5

allow comprehensive concerns to “trump” traditional values of due process and civil rights.

6

Finally, it will be interesting to see how the comprehensive law vectors will be

7

incorporated into the existing law firm and legal profession culture. One option might be for

8

lawyers to incorporate parts of the movement into traditional practice. They may view the

9

comprehensive law movement as a smorgasbord of lenses and processes from which they will

10

pick and choose, incorporating comprehensive concepts in part or in whole as additions to their

11

existing repertoire of legal moves. This is the “toolkit” idea: that comprehensive law approaches

12

simply add to the lawyer’s existing toolkit to make the lawyer a more competitive and well-

13

rounded professional. Another option might be for firms to create entire departments devoted to

14

comprehensive law approaches, so that lawyers who excel at comprehensive law practice (and

15

clients appropriate for that kind of legal work) might be funneled to those separate departments.

16

This would allow traditional firms to retain clients that might otherwise depart for

17

comprehensive “boutique” practices and would allow lawyers within existing firms to create

18

forms of law practice that might be more creative and satisfying for them, without leaving the

19

firm. Or, the comprehensive law movement’s popularity might wane and it might turn out to be

20

an experiment in the law that we as a society ultimately abandon.

169

For example, the author teaches Comprehensive Law Practice course at Florida Coastal School of Law, Bruce
Winick teaches a similar course at the University of Miami Law School, David Wexler teaches a course on
therapeutic jurisprudence at the University of Arizona School of Law.
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More likely, the comprehensive law movement will remain, to color and add to our

2

understanding of what clients and society need and require from lawyers. It will become

3

incorporated into mainstream legal practice as part of the usual work that lawyers provide for

4

their clients. It will help lawyers reach their full potential as solvers of legal problems and

5

dispute resolution professionals, help legal services consumers reach their full potential as

6

individuals and maximize the functionality of their relationships, and thereby help our society

7

transform into the next phase of our evolution.
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